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HOW LIKE A WINTER?

THE PLIGHT OF

ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS DENIED
ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION
Susan P. Koniak*
INTRODUCTION: THE PLEASURE OF THE FLEETING YEAR'

Class actions assume absent class members. 2 Notices in class actions tell class members that they need not show up in the courthouse,
although they may if they choose. 3 Class members are told that class
counsel and the named class representatives will look out for them,
*

Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Many of the arguments

made here were first made by me in an amicus brief co-authored by Professors David
Dana and David Shapiro, the latter of whom appears as counsel of record on the
brief, filed in the case of Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003). See Brief
of the Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Stephenson
(No. 02-271). The brief was submitted to the court on behalf of ourselves and
Professors Kevin Clermont, John Coffee, George Cohen, Roger Cramton, John
Leubsdorf and Henry Monaghan. I thank all of those people, but especially my coauthors, my two Davids, who were so helpful in developing these arguments. Without
them these ideas would not have been presented to the Court for its consideration. I
want to thank David Dana also for having read and commented on a draft of this
Article and Jonathan Whitby for his research assistance.
I "How like a winter hath my absence been / From thee, the pleasure of the
fleeting year!" WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Sonnet XCVII, in THE GLOBE ILLUSTRATED
SHAKESPEARE 2300 (Howard Staunton ed., 1978).
2 See FED. R. Cirv. P. 23 (a) (1) (first prerequisite of a class action is that the class is
so numerous thatjoinder of all members is impracticable"). In theory, that could be
true and yet all class members might show up in court to participate in a fairness
hearing. I know, however, of no instance in which that has happened. In many, probably most, class actions, the entirety of the class could not fit in the courtroom. All
that aside, it is nonetheless true that class actions assume many or most members of
the class will take no part in the case at any stage in its progress through the courts.
3 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 41.4, at 474 (1995) (providing
a sample notice for a class action which states, inter alia, that "[A.B. Co. and its attorney, XY.,] will act as your representative and counsel for the presentation of the
charges against the defendants. If you desire, you may also appear by your own attorney") (emphasis added). Moreover, I have seen notices that are even more direct in
communicating that class members need not appear, but may do so if they desire.
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although if they choose to hire their own lawyer, she may appear on
their behalf.4 They are also routinely told that once the decision in
the class action becomes final they will be bound by it, losing any and
all right to protest the resolution of their claims by the class action
court or to bring an individual proceeding on the claims resolved by
the class suit.5 They will be bound by it, that is, unless they opt out in
those class actions that provide an opt-out right.6
Is the language in notices telling absent class members that their
claims cannot be brought in any other court true in all circumstances?
If one sits out a class action, trusting that her rights will be protected
by class counsel and the named representatives, and those rights are
not, is she nonetheless bound by the judgment?
Class actions are not new devices. 7 Even their so-called modern
form, embodied in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and all the state rules that are modeled on that federal rule, has been
around for well-nigh forty years.8 Do class actions bind absentees even
when they have not been adequately represented? One would think
there was a simple answer to that question by now. 9 I certainly
4 Id.
5 The Manual for Complex Litigation's sample notice says: "By remaining a class
member, any claims against the defendants for damages [covered by the class suit]
will be determined in this case and cannot be presented in any other lawsuit." Id. In
the Agent Orange class settlement, discussed in detail infra Part I.D., the settlement
said that "all members of the Class are forever barred from instituting or maintaining
any action against any of the defendants ... arising out of or relating to, or in the
future arising out of or relating to, the subject matter of the Complaint." In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), affd, 818 F.2d 145
(2d Cir. 1987).
6 Absent class members are guaranteed the right to opt out in Rule 23(b) (3)
class actions, generally those class actions for individual money damages, but are not
in Rule 23(b) (1) or (b) (2) class actions, for example, class actions to resolve competing claims the resolution of one will necessarily resolve the others, such as water rights
cases, and class actions for injunctive relief, such as school integration cases. Generally, the same is true under state procedural rules. See, e.g., OHIO R. Cry. P. 23; PA. R.
Cwv. P. 1701-1716; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985)
(holding that state courts must provide out-of-state absent class members an opportunity to opt out, as well as notice and adequate representation, in class action suits for
money damages).
7 See, e.g., Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes in Collective Litigation,39 ARz. L. REv. 687 (1997) (providing a fascinating historical
appraisal of class action litigation).
8 Rule 23 was revised in 1966. See ChristopherJ. Willis, Collision Course or Coexistence? Amchem Products v. Windsor and Proposed Rule 23(b)(4), 28 CUMB. L. REv. 13,
13 (1997).
9 To assert, as I do, that there has long been an answer, i.e., class members who
are adequately represented are not bound, does not mean that there is a clear answer

2004]

HOW

LIKE A WINTER?1

1789

thought so. And I was not alone. The venerable trio, Professors
Wright, Miller, and Cooper, seemed to think so.' 0 Newberg, long considered the authority on class actions, seemed to think so." And David
to what constitutes adequate representation. There is not. See Geoffrey C. Hazard,Jr.
et al., An HistoricalAnalysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1849,
1945 (1998) (noting that the Hansbeny Court "announced a rationale for determining
when class suits should be given preclusive effect-only upon adequate representation"). The Hansberry Court "provided little guidance, however, concerning the content of that standard." Id.; see also Patrick Woolley, The Availability of CollateralAttack for
Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REv. 383, 387 (2000) (finding that
"the law remains remarkably unsettled with respect to what qualifies as inadequate
representation"). And that is a problem, deserving serious scholarly attention, as Professor Nagareda points out in a recent article. See Richard A. Nagareda, Administering
Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287, 289 (2003) (arguing that "[t]he
uncertainty over what makes for inadequacy in class representation... casts a shadow
over the finality of any class judgment").
Filling out the contours of "adequacy" is not, however, my focus here, although I
have provided some ideas on that matter in other writing. See Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv.
1045, 1048-49 (1995) [hereinafter Koniak, Feasting] (proposing, inter alia, a ban on
simultaneous representation by class counsel of two classes against a common defendant; a duty of candor to the court requiring lawyers to disclose all material adverse
facts when advocating a class settlement; and offering a detailed analysis of the kinds
of conflicts that should matter in class litigation); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (1996) (using standards from
tort law, antitrust law, and consumer protection statutes to bring content to the concept of adequacy); see also Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the
Wrong with Rights We Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 2 (1995) [hereinafter
Koniak, Through the Looking Glass] (discussing the inadequacy of "rights" theory to
protect absent class members and suggesting that an "obligation" approach would
work better, i.e., if obligations were imposed on the court and counsel which, if not
fulfilled, would render a class settlement void).
Although I agree with Nagareda that the concept of adequacy is indeterminate in
the extreme, I disagree with his take on the consequences of that indeterminacy.
Nagareda follows Kahan and Silberman in overstating the consequences for class action practice created by the current state of the law on preclusion in class actions. See
Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State Courts in
Class Actions Involving Exclusive FederalClaims, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 219, 266-74 (1996).
I refute these predictions of impending doom. See infra Part II.C. On some of the
other problems I have with Nagareda's analysis, see infra notes 48, 199, 220-21, 296,
and 349.
10 See 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4455, at 484-87 (2002) (describing the traditional approach as one that not only
demands that absent class members be adequately represented before they are bound
but that allows absentees to challenge adequacy in a collateral proceeding and criticizing the more novel approach that denies absentees the right to raise adequacy in
collateral proceedings).
11 See HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 16-133,
16-136 to 16-137 (3d ed. 1992) (explaining that Rule 23 "does not disturb the recog-
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Shapiro, a leading light in civil procedure and federal practice whose

12
work is honored by this Issue, seemed to think so too.

The simple answer was that class actions do not bind absentees
who have not been adequately represented.
But are they nonetheless bound by the class action court's conclusion (necessary for any settlement in or judgment of a class action
case) that they were indeed adequately represented, or may they challenge the binding nature of the class action judgment or settlement in
a collateral proceeding in which they personally appear to contest the
adequacy of the representation provided by class counsel in the origi13
nal class action?

Well, I thought that question had long ago been answered too
and answered correctly. They could collaterally challenge the adequacy of their representation. That had to be so. Consider just the
two most obvious reasons: (1) by definition absentees have no obligation to show up to challenge anything in the first proceeding, i.e.,
absentees are allowed to be absent; and (2) to insist that all challenges
to adequacy be made in the first proceeding would require challenges
to be made before the first representation was even complete. In
other words, the right of absentees to attack adequacy in a collateral
proceeding seemed to flow naturally from the first proposition, i.e.,
that absentees could not be bound without having been adequately
represented. And here too, Wright, Miller, Cooper, Newberg, and
nized principle that the court conducting the action cannot predetermine the res
judicata effect of the judgment" and that "[d]ue process of law would be violated for
the class judgment" to be held binding "unless the court applying res judicata could
conclude that the class was adequately represented in the first suit").
12 See Brief of the Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at
2, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (No. 02-271) (noting that
"it]he traditional rule in this country has been, and is, that absent class members may
collaterally challenge, and receive de novo review of, the adequacy of representation
afforded them in a class action proceeding"). When I heard the Supreme Court had
granted certiorari to consider whether absent class members could collaterally attack
a class action settlement on the ground that they had been inadequately represented,
I posted an e-mail on the civil procedure website to let other professors in the subject
know that I wanted to file an amicus brief in this case to support what I considered a

longstanding and important principle of law. The first person I heard from was David
Shapiro who selflessly stepped up to devote his time and energy to this project, agreeing to be counsel of record on the brief that we wrote with Professor David Dana of
Northwestern, and which we filed on behalf of ourselves and the professors named
earlier. See supra note *.
13 See FED. R. CI'. P. 23(a) (4) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if... (4) the representatives parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.")
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Shapiro all seemed to have reached the same conclusion that I had. 14
Indeed, in their treatise on federal practice and procedure, Wright,
Miller, and Cooper described a 1997 opinion holding that absent class
members could collaterally attack a class settlement on the ground of
inadequate representation this way: "The initial panel opinion [in Epstein v. MCA, Inc.] seemed surprising only by taking such great effort
to reach conclusions that many students would have thought clearly
required by long tradition." 15 But last term, the Supreme Court
seemed unable to answer the question that Wright, Miller, and
Cooper had seen as simple enough for a student. Having granted certiorari to decide whether absent class members may raise the adequacy of the representation they had received in a class action suit
through a collateral proceeding, the Supreme Court, with Justice Stevens not participating in the case, was evenly divided. 16 What I and
others had thought so obvious and so right was apparently neither, at
17
least not for the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's 4-4 split in Stephenson was not a complete
surprise. In 1998, two leading academics, Marcel Kahan and Linda
Silberman, published an article weighing in against the right of absen-

14 See NEWBERG & CONTE, supranote 11, at 16-133 to 16-134; 18A WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 10, § 4455, at 448; Brief of the Law Professors, at 2, Stephenson (No. 02271).

15 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 4455, at 478-83 (describing the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein I), 126 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1997),
an opinion that was subsequently withdrawn and replaced by an opinion holding that
class members could not challenge adequacy in a collateral proceeding, Epstein v.
MCA, Inc. (Epstein II), 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999)). See discussion infra note 104
and accompanying text (explaining the bizarre circumstances that led to Epstein I!'s
withdrawal by the Ninth Circuit panel).
16 Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003).
17 Indeed, I thought the answer so obvious that even after Epstein II (holding
collateral attack based on inadequacy of representation not available to absentees)
and Kahan and Silberman's article, supra note 9, espousing the no-collateral-attack
view, I had little interest in writing an article to refute either. When Woolley published his excellent work on this matter, any lingering doubts about writing on this
were removed. See Woolley, supra note 9. Although the arguments he presented
there differed from my own ideas in a few details and somewhat in emphasis, it
seemed that a position obvious enough to need little defense could hardly need to
have that defense presented more than once. The petition for certiorari in Stephenson
made me rethink the need to publish on this topic. The 4-4 split convinced me that
the right side, Woolley's side, was in jeopardy of going down for the count. I write this
to honor David Shapiro, beside whom I have fought for the principle I defend here in
two cases in the last eight years. I also write to stand in Woolley's corner, supporting
the same principle he wrote to support.
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tees to challenge adequacy in collateral proceedings.1 8 They were
sharply critical of the court holding that Wright, Miller, and Cooper
suggested was clear enough to make the lengthy court explanation of
its holding a puzzlement.1 9 Kahan and Silberman stated that allowing
absent class members an "unfettered" right to attack adequacy in a
collateral proceeding was a "novel" idea. 20 They argued that the right
answer was to allow absent class members to challenge the procedures
used by the first court in concluding that the representation was adequate but to preclude absentees from challenging adequacy itself,
given that absentees could have raised that matter in the original proceeding. 21 This, Kahan and Silberman argued, would give state
courts, at least when they were exercising jurisdiction over absentees
from other states, an incentive to establish and use procedures designed to protect the right of out-of-state absentees 22 and would, by
encouraging absentees to raise objections to adequacy in the original
court, help ensure that the first court had sufficient information upon
which to assess adequacy. 23 Professor Patrick Woolley wrote a powerful and careful refutation of the Kahan-Silberman position. 24 Much as
I admire his work, I must, however, confess that my reaction when I
first read it was similar to the sentiment expressed in similar circumstances by Wright, Miller, and Cooper: 25 Did this position really need
so painstaking a defense? The passage of time has proved that Woolley understood what I did not: the other side was getting up a head of
steam. Indeed, when Stephenson went to the Supreme Court, the business community came out in force to argue against the right of collat26
eral attack.
18 Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for "Adequacy" in Class
Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765 (1998).
19 See id. at 786-90 (advocating a more limited collateral attack based upon process values).
20 Id. at 765-66; cf. Hazard et al., supra note 9, at 1945 (providing an illuminating
and careful analysis of the history of preclusion in class actions and concluding that,
since 1940 when Hansberry was decided, the right to collaterally attack a class judgment on the ground of adequacy has been recognized).
21 Kahan & Silberman, supra note 18, at 786.
22 Id. at 789.

23

Id. at 788.

24 Woolley, supra note 9.
25 See supra text accompanying note 15 (quoting Wright, Miller, and Cooper's
reaction to Epstein II).
26 Brief for the American Insurance Association, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 4-5, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003)
(No. 02-271).
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Apart from the business community, academics, and a divided Supreme Court, in recent years three appellate courts have addressed
this question in depth. 27 Two gave the answer that I keep describing
as simple: without adequate representation these absentees are not
bound. 28 But increasingly, the emphasis seems to be on these parties,
as if the facts in the particular case were the decisive factor thereby
suggesting that in many (maybe most) other situations the absentees
might well be bound. The Second Circuit opinion affirmed by the
29
equally divided Supreme Court in Stephenson is a "these" opinion,
and, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, so is the recent decision by the
Vermont Supreme Court in Vermont v. Homeside Lending, Inc.3 0 Both

of those decisions reject the collateral estoppel argument of the defendants, but hold back from providing the simple answer I will argue
the Constitution demands: Any and all absentees may challenge adequacy in a collateral attack.
And then there is Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein II1).31 In that case,
after having gotten the answer right, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed
itself, an unusual move,3 2 and held that absentees must challenge adequacy in the original class action or forever hold their peace. 33 Although the Ninth Circuit's adherence to the holding in Epstein III is
27 From my longstanding interest in this topic, I can attest to the infrequency of
court decisions on this subject, which itself is evidence of the overstated nature of the
arguments that equate a right to attack to the near certain use of that right in all,
most or even a substantial minority of class action cases. For more on the sky-will-fall
arguments, see infta Part II.C.
28 See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 261 (2d Cir. 2001), affd by an
equally divided Court, 539 U.S. 111 (2003); Vermont v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826
A.2d 997, 1017-18 (Vt. 2003). The third case was Epstein II. It stands alone in its
absolute rejection of the position advocated in this Article. All three cases are discussed in depth infra Parts I.B, I.C, and I.D.
29 Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 261 (holding only that "these plaintiffs [are not precluded] from asserting their claims . . . [b]ecause these plaintiffs were inadequately
represented in the prior litigation") (emphasis added).
30 Homeside Lending, 826 A.2d at 1017:
We need not enter the heart of the debate [in the post-Shutts decisions on
whether adequacy of representation can be raised on collateral attack]....
[Even courts that restrict collateral attack have] recognized that collateral
attack based on inadequate representation is permissible if 'the opposing
party was on notice of facts making that failure apparent.' . . . Here, we

believe that Defendants were on notice of the facts that made representation
inadequate.
31 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999). Epstein and the reason for the "IT is discussed
infra note 103 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 104 and accompanying text.
33 Epstein III, 179 F.3d at 648-49.
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somewhat in doubt,34 the decision has not been overruled. The desire
to ensure finality to class action settlements so as to provide defendants with certainty on their liabilities has thus produced upheaval and
uncertainty in the law. If the price of jettisoning bad law is uncertainty, so be it. But good law should remain.
Those who argue against an unfettered right of absentees to
mount a collateral attack based on inadequacy of representation bemoan the lack of finality to class action settlements that right creates.
Due process is, however, always in tension with efficiency, speed and
finality. If our goal was to design a system to resolve disputes cheaply,
quickly and once-and-for-all, one proceeding would always suffice and
that proceeding would surely not be adversarial or conducted in what
we understood to be a court. 35 I say the simple and longstanding answer on the question of collateral attack is right and should be preserved. It is time to turn to the reasons for my conviction.
I.

"WHAT FREEZINGS HAVE

A.

I

FELT, WHAT DARK DAYS SEEN!"

36

The Exception or the Rule?

I am about to tell you three stories of inadequate representation.
Before I do, however, I want to address this question: How representative are these stories? In other words, is the treatment of absentees in
these stories closer to an exception or the rule?
I have been writing about class actions since 1995.37 My critics
claim that I concentrate unfairly on those rare cases of egregious
34 See Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 851-53 (9th Cir. 2000).
35 Class actions already come dangerously close to being process-less. Fairness
hearings are, in almost all cases, extremely perfunctory. No particular rules apply on
the presentation or need for evidence, pre-hearing discovery rights of objectors or any
other matter of significance, and the result (acceptance of the class settlement offered) is a virtual given. See Susan P. Koniak, The Lawlessness in Our Courts, 28 STETSON
L. REV. 283, 291-98 (1998) (describing the lawlessness of contemporary class action
practice). The move to deny absent class members the right to complain later about
the inadequacy of their representation in the original proceeding is thus, in one
sense, all too predictable. But that, of course, does not make it right.

36

SHAKESPEARE,

supra note 1, at 2300.

37 The first article I wrote on this subject was Feasting While the Widow Weeps, supra
note 9. I was the expert witness for the objectors in the Georgine class action, which
came to the Supreme Court as Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). I
was paid what for me was (and still is) a great deal of money for the time I spent
working on that case. Since Amchem, I have written a series of articles on class action
abuse. See Susan P. Koniak, Class Action Against Class Counsel, 1 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL
ETHIcs 249 (1996); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will be Lawyers
without Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129 (2001); Koniak, supra note 35; Koniak,
Through the Looking Glass, supra note 9; Koniak & Cohen, supra note 9.
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abuse, 38 first Amchem Products,Inc. v. Windsor 9 and then the notorious
BancBoston cases, 40 the last chapter of which has just been written and
will concern us here. 41 Some academics contend that most class actions are resolved fairly. 4 2 Implicit in their arguments is the assumption that judges who preside over fairness hearings generally function
as effective guardians of the rights of the absent class, including its
right to adequate representation, and are able to assess the fairness of
a class settlement. 4 3 That assumption is based not on actual evidence
from the class action world but rather seems to rest on two other articles of faith: the widespread assumption (which by and large I share)
that almost all judges do their jobs diligently and honestly; and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the assumption that our courts generally produce just results.
To be fair, the academics who portray judges as adequate
monitors of class action abuse can hardly be faulted for relying on
assumptions instead of concrete evidence. There is no all encompassing catalog of class actions,44 and even if there were, there is no
agreed upon definition of abuse. Take Amchem. Before that case
reached the Supreme Court I wrote about it as a case of abuse. I said
the absent class (and the named representatives, for that matter) had
been inadequately represented by class counsel. 45 I said class counsel
had sold out the entire class and that, despite the fact that this was one
of those rare class actions in which well funded and competent objec38 See, e.g., Eric D. Green, Advancing Individual Rights Through GroupJustice, 30
U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 791, 803 (1997) ("Susan Koniak has written about atrocious abuse
of class actions in some of her articles. There is, however, no empirical evidence...
showing any widespread abuse or collusion.").
39 See Koniak, Feasting, supra note 9, at 1051-86 (discussing the Amchem case in
detail).
40 Koniak & Cohen, supra note 9, at 1057-89.
41 See discussion of Homeside Lending, infra Part I.C.
42 See, e.g., Green, supra note 38, at 803 (finding no "widespread abuse or collusion" in class actions); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts:
When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1172 (1995) (arguing that it is

the failure of ethical rules to take into account the special scenarios created by mass
tort class action settlements that creates a faulty perception of unfairness); David Rosenberg, IndividualJustice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71
N.Y.U. L. REv. 210, 252-53 (1996) (challenging "the orthodox assumption that collectivization of risk-based tort is antithetical to the notion of individual justice as selfdetermination").
43 See generally sources cited supra note 42.
44 See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 9, at 1081-89 (describing the difficulties of
collecting evidence on judicial performance in class actions).
45 See Koniak, Feasting,supranote 9, at 1137-51 (describing the inadequate representation of the widowed class representatives in Amchem).
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tors appeared to explain all this to the court, the district court judge
could not have cared less. 46 In large measure the Supreme Court

agreed with me. 47 Some of my critics use Amchem as an example of my
writing about only the most egregious cases of abuse. But before the
Supreme Court decision and even after it, many others (also critics of
mine) denied or were unsure that this case was an example of abuse at
all. 48 One might say abuse is in the eye of the beholder, but I believe
46 See id. at 1048 (criticizing "the district court's willingness to turn a blind eye to
the facts and neglect the law").
47 See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-28 (1997).
48 For articles supportive, in whole or part, of the Amchem settlement prior to the
Supreme Court's decision, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 42, at 1159 n.t (stating
that while she did not fully agree with the brief submitted by the law professors in
Amchem, she also did not fully disagree either); Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 962 (1995) (dismissing the
"doubters" who "tend to focus on the specific terms of particular settlements" rather
than "comparing the treatment of claimants under the settlement against the likely
disposition of their claims at trial"); cf Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos
Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1899, 1923-24 (2002) (arguing
that class settlements like that in Amchem are less abusive of the rights of plaintiffs
than one alternative to them, aggregate settlements, and that critics of class settlements seem blind to that fact); Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1749-50 (2002) (finding an analogy between the
"overgrazing of the commons and... current [claimants]" in the Amchem case). Hensler's criticism notwithstanding, I am fully aware of the abuse that occurs in the aggregate settlement process. But abuse elsewhere simply does not prove that the abuse in
class actions is not serious and pervasive. Both systems need to be cleaned up. Moreover, there is a specific ethics rule that applies to aggregate settlements, MODEL RULES
8
OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1. (g) (2002) (providing that a lawyer cannot make an aggregate settlement for two clients' claims unless the clients have both individually given
informed consent). I fully realize that this rule is more honored in the breach, but it
provides a solid starting point for checking abuse because tort suits have been
brought and relief received for violations of that rule in the aggregate settlement
process. That means that there is some meaningful deterrent to abuse, a conclusion
confirmed by the many calls I get from lawyers seeking advice on how to stay out of
trouble in making an aggregate settlement. In contrast, as fully explained in Koniak
& Cohen, supra note 9, at 1140-41, tort suits to deter abuse in class actions are virtually nonexistent. Nagareda states that Professor Cohen and I propose treating class
judgments "specially." Nagareda, supra note 9, at 376. In fact, our entire argument
that class lawyers should not be immune from malpractice suits for shortchanging
their clients, and should not be immune from the antitrust laws or any other law, is
explicitly grounded in the cases that hold that lawyers in ordinary settings are subject
to these laws. See, e.g., Koniak & Cohen, supranote 9, at 1166 n.355 (describing a case
holding the lawyer liable for a settlement made for individuals even when the court
has approved the settlement because the client is a minor). Similarly, in discussing
antitrust law we begin by noting that those laws apply to other lawyers and argue that
class lawyers should be treated not specially, but the same as their non-class action
colleagues.
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when it comes to class actions, abuse is more a function of proximity
than of taste. From a distance even the outrageous BancBoston-type
49
settlement looked good enough to pass court muster.
I contend that the class action world is full of abuse. But if, as I
maintain, there is no catalog of class action cases and no definition of
abuse accepted by all, can I demonstrate my point without lapsing
into mere assertion, the problem I said plagues the other side in this
debate? I believe I can by describing the mechanics of the process
and the incentives of the players in that process. Most class actions
are settled. 50 On that my critics and I agree, and there is solid empirical support for that proposition. 51 Who is at that settlement table?
The defendants (or their counsel) and class counsel. Class counsel
wants the defendants to agree to a settlement as the surest and quickest means to a fee, and she very much wants the defendants to agree
to a "clear sailing" clause, an agreement not to challenge fees of X
amount where X is a fairly hefty number. The defendants want the
lawsuit concluded for as little money as possible, and they want for the
least amount of dollars the greatest immunity from other suits, i.e.,
the broadest release possible from the greatest number of potential
claimants. There is a trade to be made here: a settlement offer with
clear sailing on substantial fees for class counsel in exchange for a
chintzy settlement for a large class and a wide release. But that deal is
at the expense of the group not at the table: the absent class. Indeed,
the requirement that a judge approve any class settlement is largely, if
not completely, a recognition of the serious likelihood of just such
collusion. Not able to place the absent class at the table in fact (or
there would be no need for a class action at all), the law insists that
the judge assess what was banged out at the table by class counsel and
the defendants. 52 But the judge is not actually at the table, and is not
actually privy to all the give and take.
The judge is thus at a distinct disadvantage, not having been present at the table every step of the way. She has no reliable way to
49 That can be shown by the fact that numerous courts approved settlements containing the same scheme as that used in BancBoston. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 9, at
1062 n.29.
50 See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the
Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74, 143 (1996) (detailing empirical data on
class actions in selected federal district courts and demonstrating the prevalence of

settlements).
51 See id.
52 FED. R. Cir. P. 23(e) ("A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.").
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discern in which nook or cranny (of usually quite complex deals) evidence of collusion may lie. She may not even know what she should
be looking for, i.e., what a non-collusive deal would provide. 53 By and
large she knows just what she is told. And the telling is not done by
adversaries presenting clashing views on the settlement's fairness or
the adequacy of the representation provided (or on any other matter
on which she is required to rule, such as the adequacy of the notice).
Very few class actions attract serious objectors who would challenge
the settling parties' presentation of the virtues of the deal they jointly
press upon the court. 54 There is rarely any real prospect of making
money by scuttling a class deal. 55 So all most judges hear is a onesided presentation about how wonderful the settlement is and how
aggressively class counsel championed the absent class's cause. But
there is more. Judges, honest as they may be and diligently as most
may work, have an interest in settling any and all cases, and an even
bigger interest in seeing large and cumbersome class actions settle. 5 6
Class counsel are only human. They are not ethical heroes, nor
should we expect them to be. That means that they are quite capable
of talking themselves into believing that a deal promising them a sure
and hefty fee also does right by the class, however much a disinterested observer in possession of all the facts would think the class had
been seriously short-changed. 5 7 This is particularly easy given that all
other class actions are settled with the same incentives on all sides,
and thus the universe of settlements tends to support the assertion
that this settlement is as fair as all those other settlements that have
already been adjudged fair. The defendants, well aware of the vast
number of cheap deals that have received court approval and the high
probability of gaining judge approval for a deal, have no trouble believing that they can get their low-ball deal accepted by class counsel
53 Cf Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. REv. 1257, 1266
(1995) (describing the illusive nature of "fairness" when it comes to assessing a class
settlement).
54 Willging et al., supra note 50, at 130-31 (reporting empirical data on the frequency of objectors).
55 See Koniak & Cohen, supranote 9, at 1102-15 (describing in detail the lack of
incentives to mount serious objections to a class settlement).
56 Id. at 1122-30 (describing in detail the lack of information available to ajudge
in a class action and the incentives of judges in ruling on class action settlements).
57 1 am often misread as saying that most class lawyers are consciously corrupt. I
doubt that. What I believe is that the system condones behavior that enriches lawyers
at the expense of their clients and that it is easy to convince oneself that things a
system allows are good. When a judge will compliment a lawyer for a deal that shortchanges her clients, who can blame her for thinking the deal does right by everyone?
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and approved by the judge, giving them little incentive to offer good
terms.
I submit that one does not need a world-class economist to predict that those who are not at the bargaining table will get the short
end of the stick, even without the commentary on incentives I have
just offered. When one considers the incentives along with the basic
bargaining structure, I simply do not see how one can plausibly claim
that abusive settlements are the exceptions and not the norm.
But you need not feel pressured to take sides on this question
because the argument I will make here, that absent class members
should not be bound to any settlement in which they were inadequately represented, is not dependent on the amount of abuse out
there. I will argue that, whatever amount of abuse exists, denying absent class members the right to attack collaterally a settlement based
on inadequacy of representation is likely to increase

it, 5 8

but even that

point is not central to my position. So why this lengthy aside on the
frequency of serious abuse?
Two reasons. First, the three cases I will discuss are likely to strike
you as extreme, and so a word on context seemed appropriate. They
were not selected because of their facts, 59 but rather because two are
the most recent examples of the new uncertainty in the courts on the
issue of collateral attack-which I find troubling-and one of these is
the case in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The third
case was chosen because it contains the one clear statement by an influential appellate court, the Ninth Circuit, of the position that I am
criticizing: no right to collateral attack. I imagined that reading about
these cases, many of you would be wondering just how representative
the facts in these cases are. I therefore felt it incumbent to give you
what answer I could.
Second, and as important, the legal argument I present below
depends, for the most part, on relatively abstract propositions about
adequate grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction. Indeed, I could
have skipped most of the factual details of these cases and thereby
avoided any discussion about how representative of class action prac58 See infra text accompanying notes 356-58.
59 And my argument that abuse is widespread is not based on the abuse that I
believe is evident in these cases. I recognize that one could as easily argue that collateral attacks, which are uncommon, see infra Part II.C, were mounted in these cases
because they were not representative of other class settlements. I hasten to add that I
do not buy that last argument, and I later suggest alternative explanations for the
infrequency of collateral attack. See infra Part II.C; see also infra note 351 (explaining
that the abusive settlement in one of the three cases was repeated in other lawsuitsnone of which seems to have produced a collateral attack).
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tice the facts in these cases are. But instead of skipping the facts, I
spend considerable time on them. Why? The stories in these cases
are striking, but there is a much more important reason to include
them than that: law is not philosophy. Law is designed to operate in
the real world, now, not in some distant tomorrow. It does not speak
for our consideration, as philosophy does; it commands (however imperfectly). Thus, before we plunge into abstraction, you will be told
the facts, not just the legal holdings. When we speak of law, it is important to be ever mindful that its effects on the real world are the
first concern of law, not an afterthought. This is true, however much
our perception of the "real world" may owe to the templates of meaning that we place on it through law and the other lenses that we use to
help us make sense of what we observe.
The real world matters because real people live in it, people who
get sick and die; people who get injured; people who feel wronged;
people whose perception ofjustice is important to the maintenance of
our system of law. The absent class is composed of these people. Corporations, by and large the defendants in these actions, for all their
incorporeal nature affect the real world-with their power to do great
good and their power to do devastating and widespread harm. A government committed to living under law and not through brute force
abides in the real world, with its prisons and its schools and sometimes
with abusive practices that threaten the liberty or life of masses of people at a time. The real world matters because all these constructions-from the pain of individuals to the frauds of corporations to
the abusive practices of the police-are all liable to be filtered
through the class action device. How we construct class actions-what
the law of class actions is-thus plays a significant role in constituting
the world in which we live. What could be more important than that?
First things must come first. We therefore start with what happened
in the real world.
B.

Epstein v. MCA Inc.,a.k.a. Epstein

11160

Epstein III is the case that upended the apple-cart by holding that
the Constitution not only allowed, but also in some instances required, 6 1 courts to deny absent class members attempts to attack col60 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999).
61 On Epstein ~l's insistence that its holding was required by the Supreme Court's
decision in MatsushitaElectric Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996) (holding that a state court settlement of federal securities claims is entitled to full faith and
credit despite the fact that state courts have no jurisdiction to litigate federal securities claims), see discussion infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text. The Supreme
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laterally a class settlement on the ground of inadequate
representation. This case is commonly referred to as Epstein III for
reasons that will become apparent by and by.
After Matsushita took over MCA, some MCA shareholders filed a
class action suit in federal district court in California, alleging violations of federal securities laws. 62 Another class action, alleging violations of Delaware law, was filed by other MCA shareholders in
Delaware state court. 63 The Delaware class action did not allege any

violations of federal law because state courts have no jurisdiction to
hear federal securities claims.
Soon after the federal class action was filed, class counsel and defendant Matsushita told the Delaware court that they had a settlement
to submit for court approval. 64 The proposed Delaware settlement
would have released all the claims, state and federal, arising out of the
takeover in exchange for $1 million in attorneys' fees and "an
amended poison pill provision of dubious value.

'65

No class member

66

would receive any money.
Notice of this proposed settlement was
sent to all shareholders. The notice said that class counsel had concluded that this settlement was fair after "extensive investigation of the
facts and examination of the law involved." 6 7 The Delaware record,

however, tells a different tale.
There is no sign that class counsel conducted any discovery in
Delaware state court on the federal claims. 68 Indeed, class counsel
told the state court that they had concluded the federal claims were
frivolous after reviewing them "relatively quickly." 69 Counsel's "analysis" of the federal claims mimicked the defenses that Matsushita had
70
raised in the California federal case.
The Delaware court held a hearing on the settlement. Class
counsel did its best to convince the court that its clients' federal claims
Court decision reversed Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein 1), which had denied full faith
and credit to the state resolution of exclusively federal claims. 50 F.3d 644, 666 (9th
Cir. 1995). Note that Epstein I, II, and III are all opinions by the Ninth Circuit, although Epstein H was vacated by Epstein III, and is thus no longer good law in the
circuit. See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court case will
be referred to as Matsushita.
62 Epstein III, 179 F.3d at 643.

63

Id.

64

Epstein II,126 F.3d 1235, 1251 (9th Cir. 1997).

65
66

Id.
Id.

67

Id. (quoting the settlement hearing record).

68

Id. at 1251-52.

69

Id. at 1252 (quoting the settlement hearing record).

70

Id.
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were worthless. 71 They failed. The Delaware court found the state law
claims to be of "little or no merit, '"72 but, unlike class counsel, it was
not buying Matsushita's defenses to the federal claims. The state
court said that the federal claims had "substantial merit, '73 and held
that to release those claims for no money would be unfair to the
class.7 4 It rejected the settlement. For the next ten months the Dela75
ware case was dormant.
Then the federal district court in California entered summary
judgment for Matsushita. 76 The federal plaintiffs appealed. At that
77
point, another proposed settlement was announced in Delaware.
This settlement would have given class members two cents per share,
an amount the Delaware court called "meager. '78 To convince the
Delaware court to accept this settlement of the federal claims (recall
that at this point everyone accepted that the state claims were essentially worthless), class counsel once again set out to disparage their
clients' federal claims. They said:
[We have] reviewed the law and .. .reviewed the briefs and ...
looked at the findings of fact [and concluded that the federal claims
are] so fraught with uncertainty, that those claims are so weak, that
the record in that [sic] proceedings ... is so horrendous, that the
prospect of anything emerging from that case is so remote, that $2
million [the two cents per share deal] more than adequately compensates-much more than adequately compensates for the release
79
of all the federal and state claims.
In arguing to the Delaware court, class counsel continually emphasized how unlikely, in their judgment, it was that the Ninth Circuit
would reverse, despite the fact that the federal appeals court would
review the federal district court's decision de novo.8 0 Expressing res-

71 Id.
72 Id. (quoting In re MCA S'holders Litig. (MCA 1), 598 A.2d 687, 690 (Del. Ch.
1991)).
73 Id. (quoting MCA 1, 598 A.2d at 695-96).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1253.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 In re MCA S'holders Litig. (MCA I), No. 11740, 1993 WL 43024, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 16, 1993).
79 Epstein I, 126 F.3d at 1253 (quoting the settlement hearing record).

80

Id.
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ervations and suspicions, 8 ' the Delaware court accepted the $2 million
82
dollar (2 cents a share) deal.
Sometime thereafter the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court.
The federal appeals court found, inter alia, that the federal claims had
substantial merit, 83 just as the Delaware state court had suspected.
That court of appeals opinion is Epstein v. MCA, Inc (Epstein 1).84 In
Epstein I, Matsushita had argued that the Delaware settlement had disposed of the federal claims and that the Ninth Circuit was bound by
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution to honor that
state court settlement by dismissing the federal claims as res judicata.
The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument, holding that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause did not require it to honor a state court's settlement of exclusively federal claims. 8 5 The Supreme Court disagreed
86
with that holding and reversed.
The case went back to the Ninth Circuit. Enter Epstein v. MCA,
Inc. (Epstein I1).87 The shareholders now argued that, even if the Full
Faith and Credit Clause applied to exclusively federal claims resolved
by a state court through a settlement, they were nonetheless not
bound by the state court class settlement unless they had been adequately represented. 88 They claimed they had not been. 89 They cited
Hansbenry v. LeeP° for the proposition that absent adequate representation, it violated due process to bind absent class members to a class
settlement or judgment.
81 MCA II, 1993 WL 43024 at *1. And there was plenty of reason to do so. Why,
for instance, had Matsushita not moved to dismiss the state class action after the Delaware court had (in rejecting the first settlement) announced that it found the state
law claims-the only basis for its continuing jurisdiction-worthless? Instead, Matsushita let the state case sit dormant for months. And why was it dormant? Could it be
that Matsushita was holding this case there to ensure that it could dispose of the
federal claims cheaply whenever it found it opportune to do so? In Epstein II the
Ninth Circuit mentions Matsushita's lackadaisical attitude toward the state case as a
reason for the Delaware court's suspicion. See Epstein II, 126 F.3d at 1249.
82 MCA II, 1993 WL 43024 at *1.
83 Epstein I, 50 F.3d 644, 661 (9th Cir. 1995).
84 Id. at 644.
85 Id. at 661-66. In Epstein II, the Ninth Circuit said it had other reasons in Epstein I for holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not apply (not inadequate
representation, but still other reasons), challenging the Supreme Court's reading of
its decision on full faith and credit as resting solely on the state court's lack of subject
matter jurisdiction over the federal claims. Epstein II, 126 F.3d at 1238 n.4.
86 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996).
87 126 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1997).
88 Id. at 1238.
89 Id.
90 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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As should be obvious from the facts presented thus far, if the absent class could raise adequacy they would win. Their lawyers had
spent almost all their time arguing that their clients' federal claims
were worthless. Class counsel seemed more like Matsushita's lawyers
than lawyers for the class. 91 Undoubtedly, Matsushita's lawyers could
see that pushing the idea that class counsel had been adequate in the
Delaware proceedings was not the route to victory. They had something else in mind.
Matsushita argued that the class was not just bound by the Delaware settlement, it was bound by the Delaware court's finding that the
class had been adequately represented in state court. 9 2 If the Delaware court said (implicitly or explicitly) that due process had been
satisfied, the federal court had no right to inquire further.9 3 Indeed,
according to Matsushita, the Supreme Court had already decided just
that in this case. 9 4 Never mind that in a footnote the Supreme Court
had said it was not addressing whether due process had been denied
the class. 95 Matsushita insisted that the Supreme Court's opinion,
apart from that footnote, was broad enough to suggest it was deciding
that all aspects of the Delaware court's opinion were binding on the
absent class, including the state court's judgment on the adequacy
of the class's representation. 9 6 The Ninth Circuit derided this
91 That, in fact, is how the Ninth Circuit described class counsel's behavior in the
state court. Epstein II, 126 F.3d at 1250.
92 Id. at 1245.
93 Id. at 1238-39.
94 Id.
95 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 379 n.5 (1996).
96 In my opinion, this is not a frivolous position. The Supreme Court opinion by
Justice Thomas is written quite broadly, and the footnote purporting to narrow the
text seems somewhat at war with the body of the opinion. But there is nothing new
about that. Appellate decisions often bear the evidence of the compromises necessary
to get a majority of judges to agree. That is not a "mistake" in law. It is a manifestation of the fact that legal opinions at the appellate stage are never the product of one
judicial mind but must reflect a consensus among judges broadly in agreement. That
our system builds in this need for consensus is a fact that is largely ignored by most
jurisprudential theories on how ideal judges should behave. It is a particular problem
for Professor Dworkin's much-praised theories on jurisprudence, which posit as an
ideal ajudge writing opinions largely free of the need to get (on an appeals court) at
least one other judge to go along unless what the firstjudge says will not count as law.
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 87-133 (1986). This critique of Dworkin's
work was first articulated inRobert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601
(1986). As to what the Supreme Court "meant" to say about due process in the decision under discussion, given the tension between text and footnote, there is no one
"right" answer, which is why I say Matsushita's argument is plausible, footnote
notwithstanding.
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argument. 97
But Matsushita had others. All absent class members were bound
because some objectors had appeared to contest adequacy in Delaware. Objectors could not bind all absentees, replied the Ninth Circuit. 98 But Matshushita had yet another way to win. It argued all
absent class members were bound because they had been given the
opportunity by Delaware to contest adequacy (as the objectors had
done) and had forgone it. It was thus fair to hold absent class members, who had not bothered to object, to the consequences of their
decisions. No, the Ninth Circuit said, absentees were not required to
participate in the class action in any fashion. 99 They were not required to monitor it. They were not required to voice their objections. They did not have to do anything at all. 100 They could sit home
and wait to see how the representation looked in its entirety. They
would then, however, be stuck with the class action settlement orjudgment unless they could demonstrate that class counsel and the named
representatives had inadequately represented them. 10 1 Finally, Matsushita argued that the federal court's only job was to determine
whether the procedures the state had used to reach its judgment on
adequacy were fundamentally fair, not to determine de novo whether
adequate representation was provided in fact. Wrong for the last
time, said the Ninth Circuit, the absent class was entitled to adequate
representation before being bound, not just to adequate procedures
for determining adequacy.10 2 Turning to the merits of the representation in Delaware, the Ninth Circuit found more than ample cause to
hold that the shareholders had been denied adequate representation:
[T] he only "vigorous" and "tenacious" work... that Delaware counsel performed on behalf of the Epstein plaintiffs was to convince the
Chancery Court to adopt their adversary's position and view the federal claims as essentially worthless. This was not merely "inadequate" representation, it was hostile representation that served the
interests of counsel in getting a fee, but did not serve the interests
of the MCA shareholders .... 103
Case closed. Well, not quite yet. Epstein I!was decided by a panel
split 2-1. Judge Norris wrote the opinion. Judge Wiggins joined him.
Judge O'Scannlain dissented. Shortly after the decision was issued,
97
98

99
100
101
102
103

Epstein II, 126 F.3d at 1242.
Id. at 1240-42.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

1242-43.
1243.
1245-46.
1255.
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Judge Norris retired. Matsushita saw in that retirement an opportunity. All it needed was one more vote, and it asked for rehearing.
Judge Thomas was now in Judge Norris's place, filling out the panel.
Rehearing was granted, 10 4 and anyone could guess what was coming:
there would be an Epstein III to reverse Epstein II. And so it was, although there was one surprising twist. Epstein III was 2-1, as was its
predecessor, but the new majority was not Judges O'Scannlain and
Thomas, the new member of the panel. It was Judges O'Scannlain
and Wiggins, the latterjudge reversing himself on the opinion he had
joined just a short time before. Judge Thomas dissented, espousing
the view that had convinced Judge Wiggins once upon a time, but no
longer.
Epstein III is largely devoted to establishing that the Ninth Circuit
on remand from the Supreme Court had no power to rule on the due
process claim of the absentees. 10 5 According to the panel's new view,
if the absent class members had any viable argument that binding
them to the Delaware settlement violated due process, the Supreme
Court could not have held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the federal courts to honor Delaware's disposition of the exclusively federal claims. How could Delaware law (or the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, for that matter) bind the absentees to any part of the
Delaware judgment, if that judgment violated due process? Had the
Supreme Court not said the disposition of the federal claims was
"binding?" That had to mean, according to the panel, that the absentees were bound to the Delaware court's holding on adequacy too.
What of the footnote that Epstein IIsaid confirmed its reading that the
Supreme Court had not ruled on binding class members to the Delaware court's holding on adequacy? Epstein III said that the footnote,
read properly, supported its view of the breadth of the Supreme
Court's holding.10 6
104 Epstein III, 179 F.3d 641, 643 (9th Cir. 1999).
105 Id. at 644.
106 Although, as I noted earlier, I do not think Matsushita's argument on the footnote was frivolous, see supra note 96, I think it is all but beyond the pale for the panel
to have held that on a question as important as whether absent class members are

bound by a state court's initial determination of adequacy, the Supreme Court gave a
definitive answer in so indirect a manner, sub silentio, if you will (although the footnote makes "sub silentio" a stretch too). Patrick Woolley, obviously a much-more generous soul than I, has carefully analyzed the contrasting views presented in Epstein II

and the Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita for anyone interested in this argument. See Woolley, supranote 9, at 416-22. He comes down squarely with Epstein Ii's
resolution, i.e., that the Supreme Court had not resolved the question of whether the
class had been denied due process through inadequate representation. Id. at 422.
Anyone interested in further analysis of the scope of the Supreme Court's decision
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Epstein I is devoted almost entirely to the not terribly persuasive
dance on the head of a pin about how the Supreme Court had already
decided the question before the panel. It says relatively little about
how that result can be squared with the rest of the Supreme Court's
due process jurisprudence, which I suppose is the virtue of claiming
that the appeals court had no choice in the matter.
But Epstein III says something more than simply "the Supreme
Court decided this." It makes some effort to show that its understanding of Matsushita is consistent with the rest of the law. It argues that
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.10 7 supports its reading of the Supreme Court's view on collateral attacks. Kremer held that a federal
court had to give preclusive effect under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to a judgment reached in an administrative proceeding, provided that the state procedures in that proceeding met "minimum due
process" requirements. 0 8 In Epstein II, the Ninth Circuit had dismissed the notion that Kremer precluded a collateral attack based on
inadequate representation brought by absentees, pointing out that
Kremer's "fair procedures" approach to full faith and credit assumed
that the party to be bound had actually been before the court, as in
Kremer.10 9 The Epstein !!court insisted that Kremer did not address the
question of binding absentees. Not so, said the court in Epstein IX.
Kremer's "procedures" approach would henceforth, at least in the
Ninth Circuit, extend to absentees too.
The result of all that? Epstein I!! held that due process demanded
nothing more than that absentees have a full and fair opportunity to
contest adequacy in the original class action proceeding. If they had
been given that chance and had passed it by, they would be bound by
the class action court's ruling on adequacy. Interestingly, one of the
arguments that Judge O'Scannlain made in his dissent in Epstein His
omitted from his majority opinion in Epstein III. In dissent, Judge
O'Scannlain had made much of the fact that some objectors had appeared in Delaware to contest adequacy.1 10 As I explain below, the
should read Woolley's work. I will not treat the question further here, except to note
that in addition to the troublesome footnote, Matsushita included a separate opinion

by Justice Ginsburg that explicitly stated that the adequacy of representation was a
separate issue that the Ninth Circuit was free to address on remand. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
107 456 U.S. 461 (1982).

108

Id. at 483-85.

109 Epstein II, 126 F.3d 1235, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 1997).
110 Id. at 1257-58 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting). Kahan and Silberman advocate
allowing absentees to challenge the procedures used by the state court to find adequacy and reject any suggestion that the presence of objectors, challenging adequacy,
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lost argument is incoherent, a view shared by Kahan and Silberman as
well, who are otherwise supportive of Judge O'Scannlain's approach
to collateral attack.1" But the omission of the argument seems to
have leftJudge O'Scannlain with little to say on the merits or doctrinal
coherence of the holding he was so committed to securing. But no
matter, he did manage to get another vote.
In the real world, Epstein III means that members of the Epstein
class, even those from California where the Epstein federal litigation
had been filed, should have gotten on a plane and flown across the
country to complain about the representation they were receiving in
Delaware or somehow found a Delaware lawyer who would appear for
them and present their arguments. Having foregone this cross-country adventure, they would be stuck with two pennies a share for claims
that the Ninth Circuit in Epstein H had said were worth a whole lot
more (an assessment that Epstein III did not contest and with which
112
the Delaware court seemed to agree).
11 3
C. State v. Homeside Lending, Inc.

The class action that underlies this case is a poster child for class
action abuse, the BancBoston settlement.' 14 People from many states
had mortgages serviced by Bank of Boston.' 15 As most people know,
in the class action court proceeding itself is a reason to bind absentees. See Kahan &
Silberman, supra note 9, at 266-74. I agree with them that it is incoherent to suggest
that objectors, whom no one has found adequate to represent anyone, can by their
actions or presence affect the rights of other absentees. But that is more or less where
my agreement with Kahan and Silberman on these questions ends. I encourage all
those interested in a strong presentation of a position at odds with my own to read
their article.
111 See Kahan & Silberman, supra note 18, at 788-89.
112 In a short and powerful piece, Alan Morrison, who spends most of his time
practicing law, makes an interesting point about the timing in the Epstein saga. Alan
B. Morrison, The InadequateSearch for "Adequacy" in Class Actions: A Brief Reply to Professors Kahan and Silherman, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1179, 1184 (1998). The statute of limitations gives shareholders one year to file federal securities claims. That explains why it
was important to file the federal suit while the state action was pending. Although it is
true that as soon as an action is filed the statute is tolled, that only works for actions
that raise the claims that are the subject of the statute of limitations. The federal
claims could not be and were not pled in Delaware and thus the statute would not
have been tolled as to those claims, if they had not been settled in Delaware, absent
the "collateral attack." Dissenting in Epstein III, Judge Thomas also mentions this
point. Epstein I, 179 F.3d at 652 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
113 826 A.2d 997 (Vt. 2003).
114 The court in Homeside calls the settlement "notorious" and details some of the
national publicity this case has received. Id. at 999.
115 Id.
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many mortgages call for mortgagees to pay interest, principal and
some money to be held in escrow by the mortgage-holder-generally
a bank-to be used for paying property taxes owed by the mortgagee
and sometimes other obligations, such as mortgage insurance. Apparently, whenever Bank of Boston (and many other banks too) could get
away with it, they required mortgagees to keep more money in escrow
than the mortgage contracts demanded be there. Moreover, having

forced mortgagees to deposit excess money in their escrow accounts,
the bank paid the mortgagees no interest on this money. It was getting the use of the mortgagees' money for free. This allegedly violated federal and state law.
Class counsel filed a class action on behalf of Bank of Boston's
mortgagees, seeking to enjoin the bank from continuing its excessescrow practice, and to require it to release the excess money from the
escrow accounts and to pay back interest for the years that the bank
had the use of class members' money for free. Class counsel filed the
action in Alabama state court on behalf of class members in any and
all states that had been harmed by Bank of Boston's excess-escrow policy. The bank offered to settle the case in exchange for releasing the
excess money and a payment of $500,000 for class counsel's attorneys'
1 16

fees.

Class counsel thought the bank's offer of attorneys' fees was too

low.1 17 Would the bank consider supporting a much larger award of

attorneys' fees, many millions of dollars more, provided that the bank
did not have to pay those fees (or any attorneys' fees) itself?. Where
would the money for attorneys' fees come from? The escrow accounts
of the bank's customers. Class counsel's plan was this: it would ask the
court for one-third of the "economic benefit conferred on the
class." 118 The trick was to convince the court that the "economic benefit conferred on the class" should be considered the sum total of all
the excess money released.1 19 This was not the economic benefit conferred on the class. The excess money had always and consistently
belonged to the mortgagees. It was kept in escrow accounts in their
names. Class counsel could not "recover" this money for the class, as
it had never lost that money.
What the class had lost was the use of its money, represented by
the interest that the money would have earned had the class been
given free use of its own cash. Thus, the true "economic benefit" to
116
117
118
119

Id.
Id.
Id.at 1000.
Id.at 1002.
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be conferred on the class by the settlement of this case would be
equal, not to the excess money released, but to whatever back interest
the bank agreed to pay under the settlement. By forcing release of
the excess funds, the settlement ensured that the mortgagees would
not suffer any future damages, i.e., any further deprivation of the use
of their money (interest). But the release of the funds did not otherwise affect the net worth of class members, because the excess money
120
had always been theirs.
If the bank agreed to stand mutely by while class counsel tried to
convince the court that the "economic benefit" was equal to the excess money and that it deserved upwards of 30% of that money, class
counsel would agree to the rest of the bank's offer of settlement and
the bank would not be required to cough up any money to pay attorneys' fees. 121 The bank would just have to release the excess money,
refrain from collecting any new excess money, and pay whatever back
interest the settlement specified to compensate class members for the
time that the bank had had the use of their money for free. That is
the scheme concocted by class counsel, 122 and the bank agreed to go
along.123

Class counsel convinced the state court to award them 28% of the
total amount of excess money the bank had required class members to
keep in escrow. 124 That gave class counsel attorneys' fees of between
$8 and $11 million dollars. 12 5 Some objectors showed up at the fairness hearing to protest the size of class counsel's fee, most notably the
Florida State Attorney General appearing on behalf of Floridians included in the absent class. 126 But the judge rejected these complaints,
holding 28% was a reasonable cut. 12 7 The percentage, however, was

not the problem. The problem was that class counsel was going to
receive 28% of money that had never been lost. They had been
granted 28% of money the class had always owned and would have
continued to own without this lawsuit or the settlement.
What this meant for some absent class members was that some
piddling figure, representing back interest, was deposited in their escrow accounts and a much greater figure was deducted to pay attor120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

1003.
1001.
1000-01 n.2.
1001.
1014.
1002 n.3.
1000.
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neys' fees. 128 All those absent class members ended up poorer for
having settled their claims against the bank. For example, Dexter
Kamilewicz of Maine had $2.19 deposited in his escrow account as his
"award" from the settlement and $91.33 deducted from his account to
129
pay attorneys' fees.
If that was not bad enough, some members of the absent class
had not been harmed by the bank's excess money policy, i.e., the
bank had not required that they deposit excess money in escrow.
Nonetheless, as all Bank of Boston's mortgagees for the relevant years
were included in the class definition (supplied by class counsel and
accepted by the court), those folks were also charged attorneys' fees.
If the attorneys' fees were 28% of any excess money in the escrow
accounts, how could someone with no excess money held in escrow be
charged anything for attorneys' fees? Because to ease administration,
class counsel and the bank had agreed that the bank would take the
sum of all the money it had in escrow and calculate what percentage
of that was excess. That came out to be about 19%.130 It would then
assume, for purposes of calculating attorneys' fees, that 19% of each
class member's account was excess and deduct 28% of that figure
from each account to pay class counsel. 131 The pretend 19% excess in
each account was used only to calculate a class member's share of attorneys' fees, not to calculate interest "due" the class member. All this
meant that people like Ted Benn, a lawyer from Texas who had no
excess money in his escrow account, had no money deposited in that
account for back interest (which the bank did not owe him because it
hadn't required him to keep excess money in escrow), no money released to him as excess, and yet he did have money deducted from his
account to pay class counsel, apparently almost $150!132 Just to be
clear: people like that got $0 in recovery and paid sometimes over
$100 in attorneys' fees.
The notice sent to absent class members said that class counsel's
fees would be some reasonable percent of the "economic benefit conferred" on the class by the settlement. 133 It provided no hint of what
was actually to occur. When the bank began deducting money from
customer accounts to pay class counsel, it did not explain to its cus128
129
130
131

Id. at 1003 n.5.
Id.
Id.at 1001.
Id. at 1002. (Of course, the bank did not use the 19% assumption when calcu-

lating how much money to release from each account as "excess." It used real figures
for that.)
132 Koniak & Cohen, supra note 9,at 1274-75.
133 Vermont v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997, 1000 (Vt. 2003).
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tomers (the absent class members) that money was being deducted
for class counsel's fees or suggest that the deductions were in any way
related to the Alabama settlement.13 4 On mortgage statements the
deduction for attorneys' fees was characterized as a miscellaneous
charge. 1 35 A few curious souls, apparently meticulous about scrutinizing statements from their banks, noticed the miscellaneous charge
and asked the bank what it was. When those people began to understand what had happened, they became incensed.
Dexter Kamilewicz complained to everyone and anyone who
would listen.13 6 He wrote to the judge in Alabama, Maine officials,
and his congressional delegation. 1 37 Through a somewhat circuitous
route, his complaint ultimately got to me. A member of then Senator
Cohen's staff wanted to know whether Kamilewicz was some kind of
nut and had just misunderstood the situation or whether it was possible that Kamilewicz was correct about the facts. The staff person
called a former professor and that professor referred the matter to
me. As it happened, Dexter Kamilewicz was quite sane. More important, he was right about the facts.
Kamilewicz wanted to sue. A good friend of mine, Ralph Wellington, of Schnader Harrison, a Philadelphia based firm, agreed to take
his case. Kamilewicz and a mortgagee who was an absent class member from Wisconsin agreed to be named representatives in a class action suit against their former lawyers, class counsel in BancBoston,
alleging malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion.' 38 The
suit was filed in federal court in Illinois, where the two attorneys who
had first initiated this case (in Alabama) lived. 13 9 But this malpractice
action was to end in misery, not for the defendant-lawyers, but for
Kamilewicz, his fellow named representative, my friend Ralph, and his
140
law firm.
As soon as the federal malpractice action was filed, class counsel
ran down to Alabama to get the original class action court there to
hold that the federal action was precluded. 14 1 The federal district
134 Id. at 1015.
135 Koniak & Cohen, supra note 9, at 1275.
136 From conversations between the author and Dexter Kamilewicz and between
the author and members of Senator Cohen's staff.
137 Id.
138 Homeside Lending, 826 A.2d at 1003.
139 Koniak & Cohen, supra note 9, at 1270-71.
140 Homeside Lending, 826 A.2d at 1003-05.
141 You might rightly wonder if the Alabama court could actually threaten, as it
did, the plaintiffs in a federal lawsuit to drop their federal claims or risk contempt in
Alabama, a state that neither Kamilewicz or the other named representative had ever
stepped foot in. Good question. The bizarre procedural aspects of the Alabama
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court, obviously unhappy about finding itself in a tug-of-war with an
Alabama judge, reached for a somewhat obscure procedural doctrine,
Rooker-Feldman,1 4 2 as a means to escape. 143 The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine says that federal courts (below the Supreme Court) may not
hear claims that are in essence appeals of state court rulings. 14 4 A
malpractice action is not an appeal, or even close to an appeal, of the
145
judgment in the case in which the malpractice allegedly occurred.
The federal judge wanted out of the case, and he found a way. More
disturbing, a unanimous panel of the Seventh Circuit agreed with his
ruling that Rooker-Feldman applied. 4 6 Rehearing en banc was denied over a powerful dissent by Judge Easterbrook, joined by four of
47
his colleagues.
Meanwhile, while the case was pending before the Seventh Circuit, class counsel in the original Alabama case filed suit against
Kamilewicz and the other named representative in the Illinois case
and their new lawyers, my friend Ralph and his law firm. 14 8 The allegations were malicious prosecution and abuse of process in connection with the Illinois malpractice case. On the same day that the
Seventh Circuit panel's decision was issued, the Alabama trial court
49
ruled that the Alabama malicious prosecution case could proceed.
Kamilewicz and his co-named representative, Martha Preston,
now had to get lawyers to defend them in that case as Schnader Harrison, their lawyers in the Illinois suit, were their co-defendants in Alabama. Schnader helped them do that and, in my opinion, got them
court's tug-of-war with the federal court in Illinois are, however, outside the scope of
this Article. A fuller description of the tug-of-war itself can be found in Koniak &
Cohen, supra note 9, at 1270-74. The Alabama court's later tug-of-war with the Vermont courts is a little closer to the subject matter here, which occurred after Under
Cloak was published, and is discussed infra notes 162-76 and accompanying text, although some aspects of that contest are similarly outside the scope of this Article.
142 Homeside Lending, 826 A.2d at 1003.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Having to cite something for this obvious proposition all but breaks my heart.
For a pithy discussion of how clear the proposition should be, see judge Easterbrook's
dissent from the denial of the rehearing in this case. Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston
Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1349-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook,J., dissenting).
146 Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied,
100 F.3d 1348 (7th Cir. 1996). "Apart from other aspects of this case, the [RookerFeldman ruling by the Seventh Circuit] is itself notorious, having been subject to
extensive critical comment by academics." Homeside Lending, 826 A.2d at 1003 n.7.
147 See Kamilewicz, 100 F.3d at 1349 (joiningJudge Easterbrook in the dissent from
the denial of en banc were Judges Posner, Manion, Rovner, and Wood).
148 Koniak & Cohen, supra note 9, at 1274.
149 Id.
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better lawyers than it got itself. Kamilewicz and Preston's lawyers succeeded in getting a writ from the Alabama Supreme Court ordering
the Alabama trial court to dismiss the lawsuit against them. 150 Schnader's lawyers did not ask for a writ. Schnader was thus stuck in the
trial court, which refused to dismiss the action against it, and ended
up settling so as to be free of the Alabama court. Schnader ended up
paying the costs of the lawyers, who had concocted the BancBoston
15 1
scheme, incurred by those lawyers in their suit against Schnader.
But the battle for justice was not over. Nine state attorneys general had filed an amicus brief with the Seventh Circuit, urging reversal
of the district court's Rooker-Feldman ruling. One of the nine, Vermont's Attorney General, refused to let the matter die when the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion. Elliot Burg, a Vermont Assistant
Attorney General, was simply not about to let this matter rest. He
sued BancBoston and Homeside Lending, Inc., (a successor to all or
part of BancBoston's mortgage business) in Vermont state court for
implementing and acquiescing to the attorneys' fee scam in Alabama. 15 2 That suit alleged that the defendants thereby violated the
Vermont Consumer Fraud Act and its escrow account law, and
53
breached fiduciary and contractual obligations to their mortgagees.1
The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing, among
other things, that all absent class members were bound by the Alabama settlement and that the Vermont Attorney General was thus similarly precluded from collaterally attacking the class settlement. The
Vermont trial court agreed, stating that the Attorney General's suit
was "an improper and ill-disguised effort to overcome the preclusive

150 Ex Parte Kamilewicz, 700 So. 2d 340, 347 (Ala. 1997).
151 I know this from personal conversations with Ralph Wellington. And this
wasn't the only injustice added to the original injustice of the Alabama class settlement. Tedd Benn, see supra note 132 and accompaying text, without knowing anything about the Kamilewicz action, filed his own action pro se against Bank of Boston
and class counsel in the Alabama case. Like Kamilewicz and Martha Preston, his attempt to fight back soon became more painful for him than for the persons who had
wronged him. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 9, at 1274-77.
152 Vermont law required the bank to pay interest on all money held in escrow, so
the "harm" to Vermont mortgagees from the bank's practice is more illusory than it
was for people in states without that requirement. It also makes it likely that every
Vermont absent class member ended up paying more in attorneys' fees than they
"recovered" in back interest. Homeside Lending, 826 A.2d at 1003.
153 Id. at 1004.
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effect of the Alabama judgment."1 54 The Vermont Attorney General
1 55
appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court.
More than two years after argument in that case, the Vermont
Supreme Court issued its opinion. It was worth the wait. The court
could have avoided the entire question of whether the absent class was
bound by holding that whether or not the absent class members from
Vermont were bound, the Vermont Attorney General was not. 156 Instead, it held the Attorney General was not bound because, having
been denied adequate representation, the absent class members were
not bound. 15 7 The court, in effect, treated the case before it as a collateral attack by absent class members.
The Vermont Supreme Court gave three independent reasons for
its holding. First, the absent plaintiff class was transformed into a defendant class by the risk (and then the actuality) that members of it
would have to pay more than they received at the end of the suit.158

Thus, Alabama could not exercise personal jurisdiction over out-ofstate absent class members under Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.159 In
Shutts, the Supreme Court had said state courts could exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state absentees in a class action for money damages
without a showing of minimum contacts provided those absentees had
notice, an opportunity to opt out and adequate representation. The
Shutts Court had, however, reached that result by emphasizing the distinction between plaintiffs and defendants, 160 the latter of whom are
free to ignore state court judgments purporting to exercise power
over them when the defendant had not even "minimum contacts"
with the state in which the judgment was rendered.' 6' The Vermont
court reasoned that here the absent class, by virtue of the attorneys'
fee formula, could and (many did) end up, in effect, liable just as a
defendant might be and thus notice, opportunity to opt out and adequate representation (assuming for the moment all of those Shutts requirement had been provided in Alabama) were insufficient to sustain
154 Id.
155 Here again David Shapiro stepped up to the plate. Along with Jonathan Massey, an appellate lawyer from D.C., and me, David filed an amicus brief, on file with
author, with the Vermont Supreme Court on behalf of ourselves and other law professors in support of the state of Vermont.
156 Honeside Lending, 826 A.2d at 1005 n.9.
157 Id. at 1018.
158 Id. at 1013.
159 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
160 Id. at 805.
161 See id. at 806-07 (discussing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),
which set forth the "minimum contacts" test for the exercise ofjurisdiction by a state

court over an out-of-state defendant).
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the Alabama court's assertion of jurisdiction over Vermont's citizens.
Although not stated expressly by the Vermont court, it is obvious that
the Alabama court, not thinking of the absent class as defendants,
made no finding that the absent class had minimum contacts with the
state and could not possibly have made such a finding as to the vast
16 2
majority of the absentees.
Second, the court held that, if one viewed the absent class as
plaintiffs (which they were, at least, in name) that the Alabama class
action could not bind the absentees from Vermont because the notice
sent to them did not alert them to the possibility that they would be
charged more money in attorneys' fees than they received and thus
failed to meet the notice requirement of Shutts.163 Third, and most
important for our purposes, the Vermont court held that the absent
class, at least the Vermont absentees, were not bound because class
counsel did not adequately represent the absentees. 164 Shutts required adequate representation, as well as notice and an opportunity
to opt out (at least in cases for money damages), before one state
could exercise jurisdiction over absentees from another state. 165 The
Vermont court had no trouble finding that lawyers who schemed to
get more money from the absent class than they had delivered to it
66
were inadequate.1
But what if the original class action had been handled by a Vermont court instead of one in Alabama? Would the Vermont Supreme
Court have held that collateral attack based on inadequate representation (or inadequate notice, for that matter) was precluded? In other
words, did the court's discussion of inadequacy hinge on the fact that
Vermont citizens had been before a foreign state court?
That is one of the questions that places this case in the "these"
category that I mentioned in the Introduction, i.e., maybe these Vermont absentees could collaterally attack, but maybe other absentees
could not. But that is not the only "these" part of the opinion. The
Vermont court explicitly recognized the debate over the availability of
collateral attack that has recently developed. 167 Indeed, it cited Ep162 Alabama was chosen, either at random or, more likely and as the Vermont
court suggests, because it was-at least at the time-known to be quick to please class
counsel, apparently even at the expense of the absent class; Bank of Boston was not
domiciled in Alabama.
163 State v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997, 1008-12 (Vt. 2003).
164 Id.at 1013-16.
165 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.
166 Homeside Lending, 826 A.2d at 1016.
167 Id. at 1016-17.

2004]

HOW

LIKE A

WINTER?

1817

stein II168 and the Second Circuit's decision in Stephenson, which we
turn to next, as emblematic of this debate. 169 (The Vermont court
read Stephenson to hold that collateral attack for inadequacy was available, although I read Stephenson as another "these" opinion.) The Vermont court then said: "If we had to decide the case squarely on this
issue, we would be inclined to follow... Stephenson because adequacy
of representation is the 'quientessence of due process in class actions."" 170 But, the court quickly added, it need not enter "that
71
debate."l
What issue did the Vermont court not have to decide "squarely"?
What debate could it avoid entering? The court's discussion thereafter shows that the issue it was avoiding was whether some collateral
attacks based on adequacy were barred, although others were not. The
court explains that it does not have to enter the "sometimes barred"
debate because, according to the Vermont court, everyone agrees that
collateral attack is not always barred. 172 The court goes through the
leading "sometimes barred" theories and concludes that under any of
them, the absentees in this case (these absentees) would be in the "not
73
barred" category.1
Equally interesting and important, however, the court, in explaining why these absentees should be in everyone's not barred category,
did not rely on the fact that the absentees from Vermont were out-ofstaters in the Alabama action or that the original action had been in a
state court, as opposed to a federal one. Instead, it proceeded as if it
assumed that Shutts's statements about due process and adequacy applied equally outside the context of state courts exercising jurisdiction
over absentee out-of-state class members.' 74 Was that just a judicial
75
blunder? We will come back to that question later.'
D.

Stephenson v. Dow

In Stephenson v. Dow the Supreme Court split 4-4, leaving the Second Circuit's decision in place. 176 Daniel Stephenson was exposed to
168 Id.
169 Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001).
170 Id. (quoting NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 11, § 4.46, at 4-185).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 1016-18.
174 See id. at 1018 (noting that "[i]n the absence ofjurisdiction, the State can collaterally attack aspects of the judgment").
175 See infra notes 275-76, 292-93 and accompanying text.
176 Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003).
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Agent Orange during his tour as a helicopter pilot in Vietnam.1 7 7 In
1998, Stephenson was diagnosed with multiple myeloma, a deadly cancer that some studies connect to Agent Orange exposure.178 In 1999,
he filed suit against the manufacturers of Agent Orange in federal
district court in Louisiana. 79 The defendants claimed that his suit
was barred by a prior class action settlement-one that had been concluded long before Stephenson realized that he was ill or that his cancer might be related to Agent Orange, but one in which Stephenson
had nonetheless been included as a class member.' 8 0 Stephenson argued, inter alia, that he was not bound by that long ago class settlement because his interests had not been adequately represented in
that suit.
The long-ago class action was the mother of all mass tort class
actions, In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation.8 1 In the late

1970s, veterans had filed virtually identical suits to Stephenson's.
Those claims were eventually bundled together into one class action.
In 1983, a federal district court in New York certified that class under
Rule 23(b) (3).182 As certified, the class included all those who had

served in the military "from 1961 to 1972 who were injured while in or
near Vietnam by exposure to Agent Orange" and their families, including any children "born beforeJanuary 1, 1984."18 As the words in ital177 Brief for Respondents at 1, Stephenson (No. 02-271).
178 Id. Stephenson argued that the evidence supporting this connection was significantly stronger than it was at the time, over a decade before, of the class action
that supposedly barred his suit. Id. at 12.
179 See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 255-56 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing the initial filings by the Stephenson plaintiffs and the subsequent MDL
consolidation).
180 Id. at 256.
181 In re"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). For
a blow-by-blow description of the happenings before, during and immediately after
this historic class action, see PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic
DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986); and see also Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in
Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469 (1994). This remarkable article, written by
the presiding judge in the Agent Orange litigation-who has become a legend in his
own time for this groundbreaking class action decision and others that followedgives the judge's perspective on the case. Among other remarkable positions taken by
Judge Weinstein in his article is the explanation that he understood his job to be
providing relief to people who believed they were harmed by exposure to Agent Orange whether or not they had viable claims for legal recovery, which he did not believe they had. Id. at 543. For an extended discussion of Judge Weinstein's views of
the merits of the claims, see infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
182 In re"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (applying FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)).
183 Id. at 729 (emphasis added).
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ics show, whether the class definition originally included people who
were not yet ill is, at best, unclear. But, as we shall see, the settlement
surely meant to include them.
Potential class members, i.e., Vietnam veterans, were notified of
the pending class action by mail and radio, television and newspaper
announcements. 18 4 People wishing to opt out of the class action had
to do so by May 1, 1984.185 Shortly after the opt-out period was over,
class counsel and the defendants reached a settlement.1 8 6 Under the
settlement, the defendants would pay $180 million into a settlement
fund. 187 Seventy-five percent of that money would be distributed directly "to exposed veterans who suffer from long-term total disabilities
and to the surviving spouses or children of exposed veterans who have
died." 18 8 The remaining money, with the exception of $10 million,
would be used to establish the Agent Orange Class Assistance Program
(AOCAP), which would make grants to agencies that serve Vietnam
veterans and their families.18 9
The point of that program, according to Judge Weinstein, who
presided over the fairness hearings on this settlement (and had played
an important role in constructing the settlement as well), 190 was to
ensure that veterans who did not qualify for cash payments nonethe184 Id. at 729-32. The notices suggested, however, that the class was limited to
those "who claim injury, illness, disease, death or birth defect." See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 178 app. (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting a radio/
television announcement). The newspaper and magazine notice stated: "If you ...
can claim injury, illness, disease, death or birth defect . . . ." Id. That notice was, at
best, ambiguous on whether those who might get ill in the future were included in
this class. Whether the inadequate notice provided an independent ground for allowing Stephenson to proceed with his collateral attack is a question beyond the
scope of this Article. For an argument supporting such a basis for collateral attack,
see Brief for Amicus Curiae Public Citizen in Support of Respondents at 26-29, Stephenson (No. 02-271).
185 Agent Orange, 100 F.R.D. at 729-32.
186 Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 252 (2d Cir. 2001).
187

Id.

188

Id. at 253 (quoting Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 158).

189

Id.

190 See generally ScHucK, supranote 181, at 178 (noting that the settlement "was not
an agreement that the lawyers had negotiated and drafted by themselves and brought
to the court for its evaluation and approval"). Rather, Schuck explains, "[i]t was in
fact Weinstein's own creation in every sense of the word." Id. I agree with Judge
Smith of the Fifth Circuit that, at some point, the involvement of a judge in constructing a class settlement makes it a violation of due process for thatjudge to preside over
the fairness hearing to determine the settlement's reasonableness, because the absent
class is denied an impartial judge. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Ahearn (In reAsbestos Litig.),
90 F.3d 963, 1013-15 (5th Cir. 1996) (Smith, J., dissenting).
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less got some benefit from the settlement. 19 1 In other words, the AOCAP was there to "give" healthy veterans who had been exposed to
Agent Orange "something." Of course, whether the AOCAP actually
provided any benefit to a particular well veteran (or any well veteran)
is a matter that is open to dispute, but its stated purpose was to give
the well folks some part of the class recovery. The AOCAP was, as we
shall see, what now-cancer-stricken Stephenson is supposed to have
reaped from the settlement.
Three additional features of the settlement are particularly important to Stephenson's case. First, unlike the ambiguous class definition first articulated by the court, the settlement said: "The Class
92
specifically includes persons who have not yet manifested injury."'
That means the class included Stephenson. Second, cash payments to
veterans would not be made after December 31, 1994. That means
Stephenson, who was diagnosed after 1994, and any other veteran to
get sick after 1994 was never intended to recover cash from this deal.
Third, $10 million would be set aside to indemnify defendants against
future court actions alleging injury from Agent Orange. The $10 mil-

lion was long gone before Stephenson got sick or filed

suit.193

The

$10 million reserve is, however, important. It is, I submit, clear evidence that at the time of settlement the defendants did not believe
that the "global" class settlement was the end of their litigation
woes. 194
This seems a good place to outline the gist of Stephenson's inadequate representation claim. There were no subclasses in the Agent
191 Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 253 (quoting Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 611 F. Supp. 1396, 1431 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)). To qualify for
a cash payment a veteran did not have to show that Agent Orange had caused his
illness but only that he had been exposed to Agent Orange and had become disabled
or died in a manner not predominantly caused by trauma. Thus, it is fair to say that
the AOCAP was there to provide "benefits" to those who were not injured at all.
192 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 862-67 app. A
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
193 It did not get paid out in new state court judgments or settlements. Judge
Weinstein ordered it transferred to the AOCAP after deciding it was not needed as a
reserve for state court suits. He decided that after he dismissed a collateral attack
(brought years before Stephenson's case) in state court that had been removed to
federal court and transferred to him. See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 255 (explaining what
happened to the $10 million fund). The collateral attack to which I just referred is
discussed infra at note 222 and accompanying text.
194 This is thus concrete evidence that some defendants settle mass tort class actions, although they understand that the finality of the settlement is open to some
dispute. But cf.Kahan & Silberman, supra note 18, at 779 (arguing that without some
guarantee on the finality of settlements, defendants may be unwilling to settle major
class action suits).
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Orange class action.1 95 That means Stephenson, and all those like
him,-i.e., those who would get sick after 1994-had the same lawyers
to represent them as those who were sick in 1984. Those lawyers ensured that the latter group got money, but left Stephenson with none.
If those like Stephenson had had a lawyer assigned to look after only
their interests, would she ever have agreed to a deal that left her clients with no right to cash? Would she have agreed that similarly situated people, who got sick first, would, unlike her clients, get money?
Would she have accepted allocating 25% of the settlement fund to
"benefit" (through AOCAP) those who would never get ill when all or
at least some of that money could have been set aside for her one-dayto-be-sick clients? Would she have bought the argument that people
who might develop cancer after 1994 deserved no greater "benefit"
than those who would live healthy to a ripe old age and die peacefully
in bed? Finally, would she have agreed to set aside $10 million in the
class settlement to reimburse the defendant for judgments for (or settlements made with) people who might not be bound by the settlement, people outside the class, while her "insiders" had no cash
reserved for them?
In sum, if the post-1994s, the far-futures, had been adequately
represented, this deal would have provided something of substance
for them-or their lawyer would have insisted that they be left out of it
altogether. Put another way, such blatant bias for the presents, the
near-futures and the non-injured-at the expense of people like Stephenson-demonstrates that Stephenson was not adequately represented. 196 His group got nothing.
195

See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 259-60.

196

In their briefs before the Supreme Court, the petitioner-defendants argued

that Stephenson and those like him did benefit from the class deal in that they received a form of insurance policy, which, of course, ran out absolutely in 1994. See
Brief for the Petitioners at 37, Stephenson (No. 02-271). But that explanation only
works if we imagine that the relevant subgroup to which Stephenson belongs as the
group of those not sick at the time the settlement was made. One might say they all
received an insurance policy of a limited term. But the problem with that neat, but
superficial, reply is that the glaring disparity in the settlement is not between the
presently ill and the near-futures, i.e., those who would get sick before 1994. They at

least all get a promise of cash, albeit the money might have run out long before some
of the "near-futures" got ill. Also, a lawyer assigned to the "near-futures"-as distinct
from the "presents"-might have insisted on some method of guaranteeing that some
money would be left for all the near-futures and insisted on inflation-protection. That
being said, the big disparity in the settlement terms was between the treatment of the
far-futures (like Stephenson) on the one hand, and the presents and the near-futures

on the other hand. The ill far-futures got nothing and the others got payment or
insurance worth something. Put another way, if the near-futures and the far-futures
all paid for insurance by releasing their claims, the near-futures got a promise, how-
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But would it have made sense to assign a lawyer to watch over the
interests of a group (the post-1994 folks) who might have no one
within it? As the district court said in the original proceeding: "The
relevant latency periods and the age of the veterans ensure that almost
all valid claims will be revealed before [the end of 1994] .-1197 "Almost
all" is not, however, the same as "all." If no one was in this subgroup,
there would, of course, have been no need to include the subgroup in
the class. Having been included, they had the right to be represented.
It really is as simple as that.198
ever contingent in return whereas the far-futures got nothing (putting aside the sup-

posed benefit of AOCAP, which, insofar as it was a benefit, went to everyone alike).
197 Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 781 F. Supp.
902, 919 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (emphasis added).
198 One of the problems with Nagareda's approach to adequacy is the importance
he places on the line between class alignment pre- and post-judgment. He equates
Stephenson's plight with an absent class member who has a change of heart about his
own interests after a settlement is entered. See Nagareda, supra note 9, at 320. That
analogy does not work. Veterans, like Stephenson, who were not ill when the Agent
Orange case was settled had little reason to pay attention to the settlement when it
was made. In what sense then can we imagine them as akin to one who changes her
mind? Moreover, anyone who imagined that they might get sick after 1994 would
presumably have rejected a settlement that provided nothing for her in the event she
got sick after 1994. Class settlements are not akin to insurance contracts. If the defendant wanted to be released from all liability to those who might get sick after 1994,
those claims were worth something-and that something belonged to anyone who got
sick after 1994. To have one lawyer who represents everyone in the class agree to
transfer the value of the post-1994 releases to those who got sick before 1994 is to
accept a lawyer operating with a conflict that actually adversely affects a segment of
the class. If the post-1994 claims were worthless, the defendant should have been
willing to exempt those claims from the class settlement. A lawyer adequately representing the post-1994 interests would have demanded something for the release from
liability or demanded any such claims be excised from the class settlement. Nagareda
skips over this problem by pretending that those with future claims decide to bring
their claims in the present when they have no idea of whether they will suffer injury or
not, or how sick they will be. But in the real world, the "futures" are being forced to
"bring" their claims now and in ignorance by the defendant whose desire is global
peace. The analogy to insurance simply does not capture the dynamics of a class
settlement or the bargaining position of the parties.
Nagareda's analysis makes a great deal of the difference between conflicts that he
identifies as existing pre-judgment and those that develop post-judgment. Id. at
318-30. In doing so, he seems to be invoking a notion of alignment among class
members-at least all those not yet injured by the defendant-that is similar to the
alignment posited behind Rawls's veil of ignorance: we are the same in not knowing
how sick we will become or whether we will ever be sick. All that, of course, ducks the
very hard questions about whether "futures" of that type have a case or controversy
that any court should be deciding or whether notice demanded by due process can
ever be provided to such people. See Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
628 (1997) (discussing the serious issue of whether notice can ever be given to such
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Or is it? Recall the sequence of events after class counsel and the
defendants presented a proposal to the district court. The absent
class was provided notice of the proposed class settlement through the
same methods that had been used to notify them of the original action. This time the notices explained that there would be fairness
hearings on the settlement throughout the country and that absent
class members were welcome to come to object or otherwise comment
on the settlement. 199 The notice did not provide class members with
a second chance to opt OUt, 200 now that they had some information
20
on what the settlement terms would be.

1

Judge Weinstein held extensive fairness hearings on the Agent
Orange settlement. 20 2 Due primarily to the highly charged nature of
the claims in the case, but also perhaps a function of the broad-based
notice and the number of hearings this judge held, objectors showed
people in a manner consistent with the Constitution). Ignoring those problems is,
however, consistent with Nagareda's insistence that we see class actions as administrative proceedings and not lawsuits. See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 9, at 380 (concluding that "in parsing the process due to absent class members, the law should draw
upon the lessons that have emerged in the modern administrative state and the regulatory enterprises that it oversees"). In his latest piece, to support his views, he portrays Amchem (and, implicitly, Ortiz) as if the discussion of adequacy in that case was
concerned only with the conflict between presents and futures. Id. at 319-20 (arguing that "the dividing line that doomed the classes in Amchem and Ortiz was of the line
between manifestations of disease pre- and post-classjudgment"). That is not true. For
example, the Amchem Court was also concerned about the conflict between those who
had or would get cancer as opposed to the interests of those who had or would have
pleural plaques on their lungs and no more serious illness. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at
623-24. But that means the Court insisted on assessing the interests of class members
based on the claims they had, or would have, in the future. It means the Court rejected Nagareda's approach of seeing class members as a group purchasing insurance
behind a veil of ignorance. I believe the Court got that right.
199 Brief for Respondents at 5, Stephenson (No. 02-271).
200 Id.
201 It is impossible to provide all terms of a complex class settlement in any notice
and hope to have that notice comprehensible and short enough for the average person to read. I do not, therefore, intend any criticism of the second notice in Agent
Orange by pointing out that all terms were not elaborated therein.
202 See Weinstein, supra note 181, at 543 (noting that, as the presiding judge, he
"held hearings all over the country" and "listened to some 600 people" and "received
hundreds of telephone and written communications"); see also In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 155-56 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting thatJudge Weinstein
conducted eleven days of hearings in New York, Atlanta, Houston, Chicago, and San
Francisco, at which "nearly 500" witnesses testified, and reporting that the presiding
judge "read a large part of the relevant literature, taking judicial notice of its
substance").
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up to challenge the settlement, represented by their own counsel. 20 3
In the vast majority of class actions, objectors do not appear, particu20 4
larly not through counsel.
The objectors presented arguments attacking many facets of the
settlement process as well as the settlement itself.20 5 Most important

for present purposes, the objectors raised arguments challenging the
adequacy of the representation that the class (or some parts of it) had
been provided and made arguments similar to those I have made, albeit concentrating on the conflict between those ill at the time of the
settlement versus all those not ill at that time, instead of that between
20 6
the far-futures (the post-1994 folks) and everyone else.

The district court, and then the Second Circuit on direct appeal,
rejected the arguments alleging that conflicts within the class
amounted to inadequate representation. 20 7 Moreover, in doing so,
the courts used reasoning that would seem to apply with equal force
to the conflict between the far-futures and the rest of the class. In
short, the district court and the Second Circuit held that the strength
203 See SCHUCK, supra note 181, at 173-78 (recounting Judge Weinstein's nationwide fairness hearings).
204 See Willging et al., supra note 50, at 140 (reporting that 42-64% of fairness
hearings in the sample ended without objections). While the Willging study does not
discuss the frequency of objectors appearing through counsel, the fact that objecting
counsel are almost never awarded attorneys' fees for their efforts strongly supports
the statement in the text that objectors are rarely represented by counsel. See id. at
155 (finding "no fee awards to, and few fee requests by, counsel other than plaintiffs'
counsel"); see also Koniak & Cohen, supra note 9, at 1107 n.184 (noting that "[w]e
have found no case in which a court has awarded attorneys' fees to objecting counsel
for raising arguments that caused the court to disapprove a class action settlement").
When a court rejects a settlement, there is by definition no common fund
from which to award attorney's fees to objecting counsel. To award counsel
fees to objecting counsel who exposed a settlement as the product of collusion and thus unworthy of approval, would require the courts to find some
other source of funds from which to pay those fees.
Id. My years of research in this area also leave me quite confident that the presence
of objecting counsel is quite rare.
205 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 764-75 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (detailing the objections).
206 Id. at 771 (detailing several veterans' adequacy concerns). One veteran remarked in a fairness hearing:
[H]ow can the court award damages when there is inaccurate information
on how many veterans and their family members have been adversely affected by exposure to Agent Orange; or how many veterans have already
died; or identify those exposed veterans who are at risk of developing long
term health problems?
Id.

207

Id. at 862; Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 167.
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of the defendants' military contractor defense was so great that it virtually leveled all differences that might otherwise have existed between strong and weak claims included in the class. 208 The fact that
all the plaintiffs' claims were, according to the court, also very weak on
causation, enhanced their similarity. 209 To summarize in blunt fashion, the courts said: Given that none of the claims are worth anything,
what use would separate lawyers be? Why make matters more complicated than they need be by insisting on separate representation for
subgroups within this basically bogus suit? Of course, a similar argument might justify dispensing with class counsel altogether. Or is that
unfair? Maybe a little, but only a little.
If all the claims were equally worthless-or even nearly so-a
valid argument might be made that one lawyer would suffice for all.
If that is, all those supposedly worthless claims had been treated
equally by the settlement. But they were not. The Second Circuit acknowledged that this presented a potential problem: "It is . . . true
that the difficulty in fashioning a distribution scheme that does not
overcompensate weak claimants and undercompensate [relatively]
strong[er] ones is not alleviated by limiting the class certification to
the military contractor defense." 210 True enough. Too bad the court
did not bother explaining in any depth what made this "difficulty"
insufficient to warrant separate representation. All it said was: "However, on balance, we believe the use of the class action was appropriate, although many potential difficulties were avoided only because all
plaintiffs had very weak cases on causation and the military contractor
defense was so strong." 211 In other words, the judges thought the
cases so weak that they could not take seriously the harm that might
be done to any claimant by virtue of his getting less than he and
others like him "deserve" in relation to anyone else.

208 Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 167 (affirming Judge Weinstein's approval of the
settlement). The Second Circuit was fixated on the military contractor defense:
Appellants argued that the diverse interests of the class make adequate representation virtually impossible. We disagree. If defendants had successfully
interposed the military contractor defense, they would have precluded recovery by all plaintiffs, irrespective of the strengths, weaknesses, or idiosyncrasies of their claims. Similarly, the typicality issue disappears because of
the virtual identity of all the plaintiffs' cases with respect to the military contractor defense.
Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
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Here, you must permit me an aside. Judge Weinstein thought the
claims of all class members to be worthless as a matter of law. 2 12 In-

deed, he dismissed the claims of all those who opted out of the deal
on grounds that could have been applied to everyone within the
class. 213 In the law review article on his role in the case, Judge Weinstein wrote that when faced with meritless claims that are pressed earnestly by a class of people who sincerely feel injured and entitled to
relief, a judge should provide them with some relief, even if only token relief, legal merits notwithstanding, to help heal the claimants'
perception of legally-cognizable injury. 2 14 Were it not for the fact that
Judge Weinstein is a federal judge who apparently acts on such ideas,
his position could be dismissed as mushy claptrap. Given his job and
his actions in thatjob, the position is scary. I believe it an inexcusable
abuse of judicial power for a judge 2 15 to afford relief to those who
have no legal claims on the ground that this will make them feel better. Judge Weinstein's understanding of a federal judge's job does
violence to the case or controversy limit imposed by Article III of the
2 17
Constitution,2 16 good intentions notwithstanding.
The Second Circuit's analysis of adequacy in the direct appeal of
the Agent Orange settlement provides an example of how the law suffers when judges find it impossible to take the claims in front of them
seriously. If ill people and those who would someday get ill had claims
worth, let us say, at least a hundred times more than the claims of
never-to-be-injured people, and all claims had only a five percent
chance of success because of the military contractor defense, it would
still be true that the injured, including all the future-injured, had
212 See Weinstein, supra note 181, at 543.
213 Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 862.
214 See Weinstein, supra note 181, at 550-52.
215 Please notice that the outrage lies in the exercise of official court power. Defendants, or anyone else for that matter, are free to give money or other benefits to
people they have not legally injured and are even free to contract to do so. Class
settlements are contracts too, but they are contracts based not on voluntary agreement, but on court acceptance of the deal on behalf of the class. The class is not
legally empowered to contract without the judge. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (mandating that no class action be dismissed, settled or in any way compromised without judicial approval). Judicial approval, in turn, is constrained by law, i.e., a judge cannot
accept a settlement that does not otherwise comport with Rule 23 and the decisions
interpreting that rule. My point is simply that judicial approval is outside the law
when there is no legally cognizable case or controversy before the judge.
216 U.S. CONST. art. III.
217 Judge Weinstein should have dismissed the entire class action as meritless on
the same ground that he dismissed the claims of the opt-outs, given his legal assessment of the claims.
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claims worth a hundred times more than the others. If the injured
folks had causation problems, they were certainly no greater than the
"causation" problems (or more accurately, the "damages") problems
of the never-to-be injured. Put another way, if the court had taken the
injured, near-futures' and far-futures' claims at all seriously, at least
two troubling questions would have arisen: Would an adequate representative of the injured have given the never-to-be injured anything?
And would an adequate representative of the far-futures have accepted that its group was treated no better than the never-to-be-injured and significantly worse than the injured and near-futures?
Those questions can only be avoided by an assertion that no one
was "entitled" to anything, so that the law was properly indifferent to
allocation questions. But then the law has no business in the matter at
all. Either this is a fit subject for court resolution in which case it has
to be subject to fair rules, or it is not in which case the court should
not be resolving it.
But surely not every difference in claims within a class merits separate representation? True enough. 218 But the difference between
claims for wrongful death or life-threatening illness caused by a product, on the one hand, and claims for fear of getting sick (presumably,
the claim of the never-to-be-injured), on the other, is not de minimus,
nor difficult to describe. And a defense common to all those claims
does not somehow erase the large disparity between the position of
218 As noted earlier, Professor Nagareda emphasizes how amorphous the concept
of "adequate" representation is. However much I disagree with his prescriptions and
most of his analysis, I agree with him that the term should be filled out and that the
concentration should be on class counsel's adequacy, not that of the named representatives. See Nagareda, supra note 9, at 292 (proposing that "adequate class representation should be much more about aligning the interests of agents and their
principals than it currently is about aligning the interests of the principals themselves"). I do not want to minimize the difficulties inherent in deciding when intraclass differences demand subclasses represented by separate counsel. But the fact
that line drawing is difficult does not excuse throwing one's hands up at the task, as
some courts seem disposed to do. Many legal categories are difficult to define with
precision. As courts struggle to describe legal categories in concrete situations, precedents are produced, which eventually allow judges and academics to abstract those
characteristics that matter (define the category) and those that do not. This is how
the common law worked for centuries and how law, statutory and common law, still
works today.
Adequacy is ill defined, in part, because of the paucity of opinions in cases involving collateral attacks. But the scarcity of opinions also suggests that the disruption
Kahan and Silberman (and, to a lesser extent, Nagareda) fear will arise from a flood
of collateral attacks has not occurred in the sixty years since since Hansbery was decided.

Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (recognizing, for the first time, that

adequacy could be collaterally challenged).
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claimants in one or the other of these categories until, that is, the
chance of winning is zero percent for everyone. None of this is to
deny that there are many cases in which there is no clear answer to
whether class conflicts demand separate representation. It is to say
that Agent Orange was not such a case. My position is that, at a minimum, the far-futures were entitled to someone advocating for their
interests because those interests were sufficiently distinct according to
the settlement to merit very different treatment.2 1 9 The settlement
demonstrates how they were adversely affected by the lack of adequate
representation. Had it been made with the agreement of independent counsel for the far-futures, the court (and we) would presumably
have some explanation from unconflicted counsel on why this deal
serves her clients' interests. 22 0 That explanation would either be suffi219 As mentioned earlier, Nagareda makes much of the difference between conflicts within a class that precede judgment and conflicts that arise post-settlement. See
supra note 198 and accompanying text. I think the categories he describes are illusory, and his line thus radically indeterminate. To the extent Nagareda means to
suggest that all differential treatment, no matter how great, that is created by a settlement should be irrelevant to whether counsel was adequate, the suggestion is ridiculous. What if the Agent Orange deal had provided tens of thousands of dollars to all
those who got ill within two years of the settlement, and zero dollars for everyone who
got sick thereafter? Would those lawyers have adequately represented the second
group? Nagareda has no principled way of distinguishing that situation from the one
he describes in Stephenson. His entire analysis also places enormous and unrealistic
weight on the opportunity of futures to opt out of a deal. Consider that he equates
those who do not opt out and who later complain about a deal as akin to those who
."change their mind." See supra note 198. Nagareda's line is also inconsistent with
Amchem and Ortiz.
220 Here my point should not be misread as an endorsement of Nagareda's proposal for a "reasoned explanation," of the settlement's terms, a requirement he borrows
from administrative process. It is not "reasoned explanations" that are lacking. It is
dedication to one's clients' interests. All major (and many minor) class action opinions are chock-full of "reasoned explanations," provided by counsel to justify the settlement they have put forth. Consider the lengthy decision by the district court that
approved the Amchem settlement. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D.
246, 266-67 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Such court opinions, among the longest court opinions
in the Federal Reporter, are, indeed, often no more than a near-verbatim recitation of
the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted to the court by the settling "parties"-class counsel and defense counsel-a complete recitation of counsel's "reasoned explanations." See Koniak, Feasting, supra note 9, at 1115 (explaining that the
district court's lengthy opinion in Amchem tracked the submissions of the settling parties with only a very small number of minor word changes). Put bluntly, Nagareda's
"reasoned explanation" proposal is barely distinguishable from current practice. See
generally Hazard, supra note 53, at 1266 (explaining that there are multiple "fair" settlements or trade-offs that might be made in a class action).
My words in the text are meant only to contrast the kind of "reasoned explanation" found in Amchem, i.e., an explanation by one set of lawyers of why the tradeoffs

2004]

HOW

LIKE A WINTER?

182 9

cient to demonstrate the presence of adequate counsel or not. 22 1

The district court and the Second Circuit did not address adequacy only in, respectively, the original case and on direct appeal.
They both addressed adequacy again in a collateral attack launched
years before Stephenson's. 222 And they again found that the representation had been adequate in the original case. Right or wrong,
mustn't we have finality at some point? Is this a horror story for defendants more than for Stephenson, cancer-ridden or not? The defendants certainly say so, but their plight and the plight of all other
defendants who insist on their right to closure, at some point, will
have to await analysis. 2 23 First, we need to know more about the collateral attack that preceded Stephenson's.
between sub-segments of the class were, overall, fair to everyone, with the very different kind of explanation that a lawyer representing only one subgroup-such as the
post-1994 veterans in Agent Orange-would have to supply. A lawyer for such a subgroup could not "explain," for instance, that her clients got no relief, but that she
thought that fair because that left more money for others, who were not her clients.
To the extent I understand Nagareda's position, he seems to be imagining that all
absent classes, which are at risk of future injury from exposure to a defendant's product, have similar interests in that they are, at the time of the class suit, all behind a veil
of ignorance. Thus, in the Agent Orange case, at the time of the class settlement all
veterans not yet sick, including Stephenson, had an equal chance of getting sick
before 1994 and an equal chance (small) of getting sick after 1994. If the only claims
being released were those for fear of injury, that argument would make sense. But
once a "representative" (lawyer) is purporting to release claims for injuries, other
than fear of getting sick or medical monitoring-i.e., purporting to release claims for
injuries that will afflict some members of the group in the future and not others
(claims which might be brought in the future were it not for the class settlement)that representative must represent the interests of the set of people (identities unknowable now) who will actually be injured in the future (people who, but for the
settlement being reached now, would have a cause of action). Of course, the law
might sensibly preclude the present release of future claims in a class suit on the
ground that there is no present case or controversy under Article III, or no method of
providing adequate notice to such "futures," under due process analysis. See Amchem,
521 U.S. at 612-13, 628 (noting that both justiciability and notice problems raise serious constitutional questions). But, if the law is to allow such "futures" to be represented in the present, it seems plain to me that the representation they deserve is
representation that concentrates on the future legal claims being released by the class
settlement, not representation based on the shared ignorance of the not-yet-ill.
221 Again, I do not mean to suggest the presence of an explanation would suffice
on its own. See supra note 220.
222 See Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 781 F.
Supp. 902 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (dismissing two consolidated collateral attacks on the
Agent Orange settlement), affd sub nom. Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. (In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993).
223 See infra Part II.C.
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A few years after the Agent Orange class settlement was affirmed
on appeal, two new class actions were filed against the defendants
claiming injuries due to Agent Orange exposure. 2 24 The defendants
removed these actions, originally filed in Texas state courts, to federal
court and then had them transferred to Judge Weinstein in New
York. 225 The plaintiffs in these cases argued that because their inju-

ries did not manifest until after the opt-out period in the first class
action had ended (albeit before 1994, when the settlement provided
that no money would be paid to anyone, making this a challenge by
futures, but not far-futures, as I am using that term), they were not
22 6
bound by the settlement in that case.

First, they argued that they had been effectively denied notice
and an opportunity to opt out of the settlement. 227 They attacked the
notice both because many of them had not received any individual
notice, and more generally as any notice would have been meaningless to them because at the time it was sent they were healthy. 228 For

them, any notice would have been of minimal interest as it did not
dispose of claims they had or believed they would have. Both the district court and the Second Circuit rejected the notice argument, as
they had before. 22 9 Although I think those rulings are wrong, too, I
leave that argument for another day. 23 0 Here, the important point is
224 See Agent Orange, 996 F.2d at 1430 (recounting the two cases' histories).
225 Id. The Second Circuit held that removal by the district court was appropriate
under the All Writs Act to prevent frustration of the court's order. Id. at 1431. The
recent Supreme Court decision in Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28
(2002), rejects that justification for removal. Stephenson's case, because filed originally in federal court and then transferred to the Eastern District of New York, was
unaffected by Syngenta, but the Second Circuit had considered Stephenson's case
along with a case brought in state court that had been removed to federal court. See
infranote 241 (discussing the state court case decided alongside Stephenson's federal
case).
226 See Agent Orange, 996 F.2d at 1433-39 (discussing plaintiffs' arguments that
they are not bound by the Agent Orange settlement).
227 Id. at 1435.
228 Id.
229 See id. at 1436 (noting agreement with the district court that "designation of a
subclass of future claimants and appointment of a guardian to represent their interests was unnecessary" because the settlement was structured to protect future
claimants).
230 To explain in broad strokes why I believe that, I provide this brief summary of
my position. Notice of a class action-however communicated-must, at a minimum,
be capable of communicating (to the one to whom notice is directed) what interest of
his is before the court. I do not think that is possible when the interest identified in
the notice is one that the notified person does not understand as his own. If one is
not sick and one receives a notice of a lawsuit that resolves the claims of sick people, I
do not see why one would pay the slightest attention to it, i.e., would be notified by it

2004 ]

HOW

LIKE A

1831

WINTER?

not what I think about the notice arguments in Ivy/Hartman23 1 (the
pre-Stephenson collateral attack), but what the Second Circuit said
about them. It said:
[P] roviding individual notice and opt-out rights to persons who are
unaware of an injury would probably do little good. Their rights are
better served, we think, by requiring that "fair and just recovery procedures be[ ] made available to these claimants," and by ensuring
232

that they receive vigorous and faithful vicarious representation.

The Second Circuit held that, in a suit involving "futures," due
process-a "flexible" concept 233-rested on adequate representation,
rather than notice or the opportunity to opt out. 234 Conflicts of interest could mean that the representation was inadequate, but here the
conflicts "never materialized." The alleged conflict between the interests of present and future claimants was imaginary, according to the
court, in this case.
These plaintiffs [near-futures], like all class members who suffer
death or disability before the end of 1994, are eligible for compenthat one's interests are at stake. But, you might say, what if the notice clearly states
that the suit will dispose of the claims that well folks might someday have, assuming
they get sick? Isn't that "notice" enough? No. Notice of hypothetical involvement (if
you get sick, then this affects you) is simply not the same as notice of involvement. In
the real world, the first will often be ignored whereas that is not true of the second. If
not ignored completely, the first will rarely, if ever, be taken as seriously as the second.
For the law to assert that both types of notices nonetheless equally "notify" someone
puts law at war with experience. Indeed, for the law to say that the second "notifies"
someone in any meaningful way at all puts law at war with experience. The Second
Circuit apparently shares that view. See infra note 232 and accompanying text. Notice, central as it is in our system, to due process and basic fairness, is simply too
important a concept to tolerate so strained a relationship to the real world. In
Amchem, the Supreme Court expressed serious doubt about whether notice to not-yetinjured folks was consistent with due process, although it did not decide the matter.
It could have disposed of Stephenson on these grounds, but it did not. Why? First, it
was not the question upon which certiorari was granted. But more important, to hold
that "futures" (as those whose injuries have not manifested at the time of a class action
are generally called) cannot constitutionally be given notice would effectively end
futures class actions and I do not believe the Court is ready to take that step and close
the door completely on a device (futures class actions) that defendants and plaintiffs'
class action lawyers alike find so useful.
231 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. (Ivy/Hartman), 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir.
1993).
232 Id. at 1435 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
233 See id. at 1435 (quoting In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 745 (4th Cir.
1989)).
234 Id. (holding that "[i]n the instant case, society's interest in the efficient and
fair resolution of large scale litigation outweighs the gains from individual notice and
opt-out rights, whose benefits here are conjectural at best").
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sation from the Agent Orange Payment Fund. The relevant latency
periods and the age of the veterans ensure that almost all valid
2 35
claims will be revealed before that time.
That argument does not, however, address the conflict between
all the injured and the never-to-be-injured. It addresses the conflict
between the near-futures and the far-futures only long enough to dismiss it on the ground that there are not likely to be many far-futures.
What still united this class, according to the court, was the weakness of
the claims. 236 The near-futures argued that in the years since the case
was settled, their claims had grown stronger. Had they been independently represented in the original proceeding, they said, their lawyer
would have anticipated that possibility and pushed for the settlement
to take account of it.2 3 7 The court acknowledged that in the intervening years the military contractor defense, previously the cornerstone
of the court's conflict analysis, "had been somewhat limited by the
Supreme Court." 238 But the defense would still present a problem for
Agent Orange plaintiffs. Moreover, the claims had other serious
weaknesses: establishing causation and the level of exposure to Agent
Orange that any particular veteran had had. 239 For the Second Circuit, because the claims were as weak as ever, the collateral challenge
to adequacy was no stronger than it had been when raised on direct
review.
Did this mean the court was open to a new challenge on adequacy if and when the claims got stronger? The section of the opinion I have just discussed is open to that reading, but immediately
following its holding that the representation "was more than adequate
to protect" the plaintiffs in Ivy/Hartman, the court spoke in much
more absolute terms. Quoting extensively from the settlement itself
and an earlier opinion by the district court, both proclaiming that all
class members are "forever barred" from suing the defendants in relation to Agent Orange, the Second Circuit went out of its way to state
and emphasize that the plaintiffs before it, as members of the original
class, were bound by those provisions and thus that their suits were
properly dismissed. 2 40 Indeed, in this section of the opinion, the
court's tone and language suggest that the "forever barred" language
was sufficient on its own to dispose of the case. In other words, the
opinion is somewhat ambiguous on whether the plaintiffs had a right
235
236
237
238

Id. at 1436.
Id. at 1434.
Id.
Id. at 1436.

239
240

Id. at 1436-37
Id. at 1437-38.
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to raise adequacy collaterally or not. On the whole I think the court's
discussion of the merits of the challengers claims suggests that they
had a right to raise the collateral attack, but parts of the opinion create some doubt.
Five years after the Second Circuit dismissed the collateral attack
in Ivy/Hartman, twelve years after the settlement was affirmed on appeal, and fifteen years after the fairness hearings on the settlement,
Stephenson 241 sued the defendants, claiming he was not adequately
represented in the original case and thus was not bound by that settlement. Did the courts really have to examine this issue yet again?
To the surprise of many-not just the defendants, I am sure-the
Second Circuit thought so. The defendants argued, in effect, that Stephenson's tort claims were res judicata by virtue of the class settlement and that his claim of inadequate representation was res judicata
by virtue of any prior determination of that question-and here there
had been a plethora of prior cases, outlined above, all saying the rep24 2
resentation had been adequate.
The Second Circuit cited the longstanding rule of Hansbery v.
Lee: whether the claims of an absent class member are res judicata
depends on whether he was adequately represented. 2 43 Could earlier
rulings on adequacy bind absent class members who had not themselves participated in the proceedings that produced those rulings?
To that critical question, the Second Circuit had two answers. First,
even if they could, no court had ever ruled on the precise adequacy
question that Stephenson raised, i.e., the conflict between the far-futures and everyone else. 244 Second, the court said absent class mem-

bers were not bound by adequacy rulings made in proceedings in
which they had not participated. "A collateral attack to contest the
application of resjudicata [based on inadequate representation or defective notice, for that matter] is available. 2 4 5
241 The Second Circuit case involved another plaintiff, Joe Isaacson, but the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's decision as it applied to him and directed
that court to reconsider his case in light of Syngenta Crop Protection,Inc. v. Henson, 537
U.S. 28 (2002), decided a year earlier. Syngenta had held that federal courts were not
to use the All'Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000), to issue injunctions to stop collateral
state court proceedings to prevent the frustration of previously issued federal court
orders.
242 See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2001).
243 Id. at 258 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940))
244 Id. at 258-59.
245 Id. at 259. Although the court's discussion of the general availability of collateral attack concentrates on challenging the res judicata effect of a settlement based
only on inadequate representation, the court's discussion of the merits shows that its
discussion was meant to apply equally to challenges based on defective notice.

1834

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL- 79:5

The court then proceeded to the merits. This time, in my opinion, it got them right, even going so far as to jettison completely the
core of its prior analysis: "The ultimate merits of the [Agent Orange]
claims have no bearing on whether the class previously certified adequately represented these plaintiffs." 24 6 That amounts to a significant
change of heart. What accounts for it? The opinion suggests two factors. First, the Supreme Court decisions in Amchem24 7 and Ortiz v.
FibreboardCorp.248 had been issued in the years since Ivy/Hartman.249
Both Supreme Court decisions emphasized the real tension between
the interests of those currently eligible to take from a settlement fund
(the presents) and those who may be eligible to draw on the fund in
years to come (the futures).250 Both those decisions held that the two
groups need separate counsel because the futures are interested in
controlling current payouts to ensure money is available for them,
while the presents are interested in getting big payouts now. 25 1 The

Second Circuit rightly recognized that class counsel in the original
proceedings (the counsel for the far-futures and everyone else in the
class) did not just fail to insist on money being reserved for people
like Stephenson; they supported a settlement that gave him nothing
252
and their other clients (the remainder of the class) everything.
This surely was inconsistent with "the teaching" 25 3 of Amchem and
Ortiz.

On the other hand, the court took pains to distinguish its holding
in Ivy/Hartman, which had criticized the present/future distinction,
from its holding in Stephenson's case. 254 It emphasized that in Ivy!

Hartman it only addressed the alleged conflict between near-futures
and presents (as opposed to that between far-futures and everybody
else) and thus Ivy/Hartman could be read, according to the Second
Circuit, as consistent with Amchem and Ortiz. Here, the Second Circuit
asserted that Amchem and Ortiz said only that there may be a conflict
246

Id. at 261.

Stephenson takes it further than I do. See supra text accompanying

notes 210-12 (arguing that in some cases the weakness of the claims might obviate
the need for separate representation, assuming it was obvious the claims were all
equally worthless and the settlement treated them all the same way).
247 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
248 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
249 Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 251, 259-61
250

Id. at 259-61.

251

Id. at 260 (quoting Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626).

252

Id. at 260-61.

253

Id. at 261.

254

Id. at 257-58, 260 n.7.
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between presents and futures, not that there must be one. 255 If that is
all Amchem and Ortiz said about presents and futures (and I am not
arguing here to the contrary), one can read those cases as consistent
with Ivy/Hartman. That would, however, require more of an explanation than the Second Circuit provides as to why the conflict between
presents and futures in the Supreme Court cases was significantly
worse than that in the Agent Orange class settlement. Given that the
Second Circuit in Stephenson undercuts its previous reason for dismissing the importance of the conflict (the Agent Orange cases were
worthless on the merits), the opinion is not terribly persuasive in explaining why all the previous rulings on the conflict between presents
and futures in the Agent Orange litigation are consistent with Amchem
and Ortiz. The court's effort to distinguish Ivy/Hartman (and implicitly all the other rulings on the adequacy of representation in the
Agent Orange litigation) from Stephenson succeed only in conveying
that the court sees the conflict between far-futures and everyone else
in the class as significant in a way that was not true of the conflict
between near-futures and presents.

25 6

That conclusion, however,

raises a problem, which is independent of the court's failure to explain in a convincing fashion just why one conflict matters and the
other doesn't. The problem is that in Ivy/Hartman the court did mention the far-futures, although it seemed unconvinced that they would
25 7
suffer any injury from having lacked independent representation.
Why not? Because the court then seemed unconvinced that there
would be any far-futures with significant illnesses, even arguably related to Agent Orange. 258 Stephenson (and Isaacson) 259 made the
judges thinkagain.
The defendants were thinking, too, but my guess is that their
thoughts, if honestly expressed, would be too full of invectives to
print. All this solicitation for Stephenson's due process rights-what
about theirs? Off to the Supreme Court they went only to be disappointed by the 4-4 split that left the Second Circuit ruling in place.
I too was disappointed, to put it mildly, but for very different reasons. Consider the three cases just described. They involve an absentee, Stephenson with cancer, whose lawyers negotiated no money for
him to collect for his alleged injuries because he got sick a few years
255 Id. at 261 (noting that "[t]hose cases indicate that a class which purports to
represent both present and future claimants may encounter internal conflicts.").
256 Id. at 257-59.
257 Ivy/Hartman, 996 F.2d 1425, 1434 (2d Cir. 1993).
258 Id. (quoting Uniroyal Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1389 (E.D.N.Y.

1988)).
259

See supra note 225 (explaining what happened to plaintiff Isaacson's claim).
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too late; an absentee, Kamilewicz, who was charged 4155% of his "recovery" in attorneys' fees, 2 6 0 and Epstein and his fellow shareholders,
who got two cents a share for claims the Ninth Circuit said were worth
26 1
a whole lot more than that.
The suggestion that absentees must monitor class action proceedings so that they can appear-flying cross country, if necessary-to
protect themselves from representatives that portray their claims as
worthless as in Epstein, that steal money from them as in BancBoston or
that saves no relief for them at all as in Stephenson, on pain of being
bound forever is an outrage. But the Supreme Court's indecision is
not troubling solely or even primarily because of the injustice it suggests the Court might tolerate. The indecision suggests a willingness
by some significant number of Justices to render procedural law incoherent in the name of expediency. It suggests a willingness to abandon principle based on the arguments of self-interested defendant
corporations who grossly overstate the effects that the rights of absentees have on their willingness to settle class action claims.
It is time to analyze the legal arguments on the right of absentees
to challenge adequacy-the right of Stephenson, the Vermont mortgagees, and the California investors.
II.
A.

THE ABUNDANT ISSUE:

262

DUE PROCESS

CollateralAttack Is Constitutionally Guaranteed

My position is simple-let me summarize it. Under the Constitution, adequacy of representation is what gives a court the power to
affect the rights of absent class members. The Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments set limits on the jurisdiction
that courts may exercise over persons. A court cannot conclusively
determine its own jurisdiction, particularly not when the alleged defect to its jurisdiction is of constitutional significance. Thus, the rights
of absent class members to attack collaterally class action judgments
or settlements is constitutionally guaranteed, whether the class action
was in federal or state court and whether, assuming it was in state
court, the absent class members reside in the state or without. The
court in which the challenge is brought must review adequacy de novo
to avoid binding the challenger to any part of a judgment (or settlement) until that court determines that the first court had the power to
260
261
262

See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 9, at 1066-67.
Epstein II, 126 F.3d at 1253, 1255.
"Yet this abundant issue seem'd to me / But hope of orphans and unfathered

fruit" SHAKEsPEARE, supra note 1, at 9-10.
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affect the rights of the challenger. Any lesser standard of review
would be incoherent.
It all starts with Hansberny v. Lee.263 Hansbery held that, as a matter of due process, absent class members cannot be bound to a class
action judgment in which they have not been adequately represented. 26 4 Petitioner Hansberry and his colleagues were not challenging the adequacy of the representation they had received in the class
proceeding in an appeal from the class action court's ruling. They
were challenging adequacy in a "collateral" 26 5 proceeding in which
they were defendants. The plaintiffs in the collateral action sought to
bar Hansberry2 66 from mounting a certain defense on the ground that
it involved a matter that was res judicata for Hansberry by virtue of an
earlier class action in which Hansberry and his fellow petitioners had
been absent class members. 2 67 The Supreme Court holding meant
263 311 U.S. 32 (1940). In his recent article on Stephenson, Nagareda provides an
interesting discussion of some overlooked facts in Hansberry. See Nagareda, supranote
9, at 298-99.
264 Id. at 45-46.
265 I put the word "collateral" in quotes here to make this point: although I have
used throughout this Article the standard nomenclature, referring to actions to vindicate alleged wrongs as "collateral" whenever the defendant seeks to bar the action on
the ground that the plaintiff was a member of a class in an action previously resolved
and is properly bound by that action, the nomenclature suggests a bias. Collateral
proceedings are disfavored in law. To call these actions collateral is to none-too-subtlely suggest that the plaintiff is presumptively bound. When the plaintiff was a
named party, properly served, and especially when she was actually present for the
proceedings, the presumption implicit in the word "collateral" is not troubling. But
when we are speaking of absent class members, who did not appear in the original
proceeding and may or may not have received any, or effective, notice, the implicit
presumption strikes me as unwarranted. In Hansberry, the absentee being accused of a
collateral attack was a defendant, which is not usually the case, as I have just explained. But what I have just said as to plaintiffs seems to apply with equal force to
defendants, like Hansberry, who are alleged to be bound by a previous class resolution. Having explained my concern about the usual terminology, I will proceed to use
the term "collateral" because that is the language commonly used in discussing these
questions.
266 And Hansberry's co-defendants, as Nagareda rightly points out. Nagareda,
supra note 9, at 297.
267 I do not mean to suggest that the facts in Hansberny are unimportant by my
sanitized approach. The fact that underneath all this procedural wrangling were the
ugly realities of restrictive covenants, barring African-Americans, like Hansberry, from
buying land in certain neighborhoods is important to an underrstanding of this case's
importance and the Supreme Court's ruling itself. The original suit, which the Illinois courts and thus the Supreme Court treated as a class action, is barely recognizable as one, but what is recognizable is the signs of collusion it bore. What does all that
mean for how we should view the holding here? The first thing to notice is that all
the "hot" facts have not rendered the case an oddity; it is considered a standard of
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that Hansberry, as' a defendant, could treat the prior action as if it
were void as to him and mount a defense completely inconsistent with
it. Finally, let us keep in mind that Hansberry did not involve absent
class members from out of state, nor did it involve one state's courts
deciding what effect, if any, to give another state's judgments. The
class action proceeding at issue in Hansbery had been decided by an
Illinois state court and the collateral attack on thatjudgment was also
before an Illinois court. No one suggested that Hansberry or his fellow petitioners had not been subject to the territorial jurisdiction of
the Illinois courts. For all one can discern from the Supreme Court's
decision, they were all residents of Illinois at all relevant times.
But the question of collateral attack by absentees does not end
with Hansbery, or, at least no one seems to think so anymore. Why
not? First, the fact that Hansberry happened to raise the adequacy
question in a collateral proceeding does not mean that the Constitution requires that one be able to raise it there. Justice Stone never
said that. Indeed, he never considered the question whether Hansberry, entitled as he was to adequate representation, had lost his
chance to raise that issue by having failed to raise it in the class action
proceeding itself.268 None of that, however, means that Hansberry has

nothing to tell us about when adequacy must be open to challenge.
Everyone agrees that Hansbery is a due process case. Justice
Stone says so in the majority opinion. 2 69 In what way, however, is due
process offended by binding an absent class member to a judgment
when he has been inadequately represented? Justice Stone did not
use the word 'jurisdiction" in Hansberry, but it is nonetheless beyond
doubt that when he said "due process" he meant the limits of legitimate jurisdiction. To bind absent class members without adequate
representation would offend due process because due process includes constraints on how any court may "dispose[ ] of an individual's
situation." 2 70 Here are Justice Stone's words:
civil procedure, a bedrock ruling that all law students are taught. Second and related,
it seems to me that the Court found the least controversial method of entering the
hot-button topic, at least then and for some even now, of restrictive covenants. It took
a case on the issue when it could speak on solid ground. In short, for me the background of the case only bolsters the vision of Hansbeny as foundational, assuming in
anyone's eyes it needs any bolstering.
268 Given the facts of Hansbeny that is no surprise. Whatever "notice" of the first
class action proceeding there had been, it does not seem likely that any real attempt
was made to apprise all reachable members of the absent class of the pendency of the
class suit.
269 Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 37.
270 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 10-12, at 713 (1988).
Professor Tribe's words, which I have seriously truncated here, were not written about
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It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not
been made a party by service of process.
To [that] general rule[ ] there is a recognized exception that,
to an extent not precisely defined by judicial opinion, the judgment
in a "class" or "representative" suit, to which some members of the
class are parties, may bind members of the class or those repre2 71
sented when not made parties to it.

Pennoyer, invoked by Stone, was one of the earliest and most famous cases to articulate the jurisdictional limits embedded in the concept of due process. Although the precise limit set forth in Pennoyer
no longer stands, its affirmation that due process includes jurisdictional limits is still good law:
[P]roceedings in a court ofjustice to determine the personal fights
and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction
do not constitute due process of law. Whatever difficulty may be
experienced in giving [due process] a definition.., there can be no
doubt of their meaning when applied to judicial proceedings. They
then mean a course of legal proceedings according to those rules

Hansberryor class actions, but his words capture the jurisdiction aspect of due process
that underlies Hansberry. Professor Tribe's statement is, as he explains, his restatement (and refinement) of Professor Van Alstyne's notion that central to due process
is the "old liberty" to be free of arbitrary adjudicative procedures. See William Van
Alstyne, Cracks in the New Property:Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62
CORNELL L. REv. 445 (1977).
Both those professors were struggling with "newer"
questions of procedural justice rather than when courts may legitimately bind class
members to a judgment. Whether or not the "old liberty" is a powerful enough construct to answer the difficult procedural questions raised by the modem, expanded
notion of property, and our modem administrative state with all its variety, is a question I am not prepared to answer, but I believe it captures well the animating principle of Hansbeny.
I realize that invoking "liberty" here runs the risk of miring me in a debate that I
find formalistic and unhelpful, on whether "adequacy" and "personal jurisdiction" are
elements of procedural or substantive due process. Supposedly, they are not only in
different categories, but never the twain shall meet, i.e., there is no overlap between
these categories. To the degree it matters to any of you, my position is that there is
overlap and that both concepts can be seen as expressing aspects of both categories.
In short, my position is that the categories do not get us anywhere. With apologies to
all those who see these categories as central, particularly to the problem before us, I
have neither the space here nor the heart to provide any fuller justification of my
disinterest in this debate.
271 311 U.S. at 40-41 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)).
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of jurisprudence for the protection and enforce-

ment of private rights.

2 72

Pennoyer also contains a corollary to its pronouncement that due
process contains some limits on jurisdiction, i.e., the limits that we
consider foundational to basic notions of fairness in adjudication.
The corollary, also still good law, is that an individual is free to treat a
court order entered against him by a court with no constitutional
power over him as a nullity. 273 If that order or judgment is later raised

in a court of competent jurisdiction, a person may contest the first
court's power to bind him by litigating there the question of the first
court's jurisdiction. If the second court finds the first court had jurisdiction, it must honor its order. If not, not.
Thus, if adequacy of representation is the lynchpin to the constitutional exercise of jurisdiction over absent class members, as I read
Hansbeny to say, Pennoyers corollary principle-let us call it the nullity
principle-supports the right to collateral attack. At least that is so if
the nullity principle is also of constitutional dimension-and it is, as I
will now proceed to show.
I am a supporter of the exclusionary rule, but I recognize that it is
true, as the Court now contends and many scholars believe, that the
constitutional wrong of, for example, illegal searches may be vindicated, at least in theory, without excluding the illegally seized evidence at trial. 2 74

But a similar argument cannot be made about

vindicating the unconstitutional exercise of jurisdiction. Either the
unconstitutional exercise of power changes the legal position of a person or it does not. To hold that upon notice of a court's attempt to
exercise suspect jurisdiction, one must subject oneself to that court's
jurisdiction, at least for the purpose of contesting jurisdiction, gives
force to the exercise ofjurisdiction that cannot be removed by a hold272
273

Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
Id. at 722-23.

274 See Akhil Reed Amar, Against Exclusion, 20 HARV.J.L. &PUB. POLIcY 457 (1997)
(arguing for a significant narrowing or abandonment of the exclusionary doctrine).
On the other hand, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), one of the earliest, if
not the earliest, cases to interpret the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as applied to the
states, held that the evidence was obtained by the government unconstitutionally, and
excluded the evidence without any discussion of whether the Constitution could be
vindicated by some more modest approach. The specific holding of Boyd, like that of
Pennoyer,has not stood the test of time. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407
(1975). Nonetheless, Boyd in the area of constitutional criminal procedure, like Pennoyer in the area of constitutional civil procedure, occupies a central place in the
historical development of its area of law, and still has much to teach us. Most important here, Pennoyers nullity principle is still good law. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
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ing by that court that it has no power. The person was forced to show
up to argue jurisdiction: the exercise of jurisdiction has had its effect.
And that effect is one that a court's later ruling cannot eliminate-the
person was forced by a court to do what the court had no power to
force the person to do: show up and plead to it.275
Moreover, the same logic demands that in a collateral attack the
second court must review the first court's exercise of jurisdiction de
novo. Any requirement of deference to the first court's judgment,
again, gives that judgment effect, whether it is constitutional or not.
The nullity principle, as I'm calling it, thus (1) is a necessary corollary
to any due process limit on the exercise of personal jurisdiction; (2)
includes within it the right to collateral attack; and (3) demands that
the matter subject to collateral attack be considered de novo.
Why isn't notice and opportunity to opt out a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction?27 6 Well, there's Hansberry. But more can be said. At
least since the adoption of Rule 23's basic structure in 1966, only absent class members in (b) (3) classes, essentially those primarily for
individual money damages, have a right to notice and an opportunity
to opt out. Have courts lacked jurisdiction for all these years over
other absentees? Could it be that in non-(b) (3)-type class actions jurisdiction is conferred by adequacy of representation, but in (b) (3)
adequacy is not jurisdictional? Logically, I suppose that's possible, although it makes little sense. First, the line between the various types
of class actions is permeable, not a barrier. Indeed, it is not much of a
line at all. 2 77 Second, there is the problem of "futures." I believe that
275 See Woolley, supra note 9, at 392-410 (arguing that jurisdiction is the key to the
debate on the right of absentees to attack a class judgment in a collateral proceeding); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent
Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148 (1998) (arguing, based primarily
on Shutts, that adequacy is necessary for state courts to take jurisdiction over out-ofstate absentees). Professor Monaghan, however, signed the brief submitted by Shapiro, Dana, and I in Stephenson, which expands the jurisdiction argument to all absentees. But see infra text accompanying notes 337-39 (discussing a statutory exception
to the nullity principle).
276 In his thorough and important contribution on this subject, Professor Woolley
asserts (citing PhillipsPetroleum v. Shutts, 487 U.S. 1223 (1998)) that absent class members who receive notice and the opportunity to opt out "consent" to the jurisdiction of
the court, at least in class actions for individual money damages. See Wooley, supra
note 9, at 396. I read Shutts to require adequacy in addition to notice and an opportunity to opt out as necessary for jurisdiction over out-of-staters. See infra at notes 292
and accompanying text (setting forth two plausible readings), 293 (rejecting Woolley's third alternative).
277 See generally Linda S. Mullenix, No Exit: Mandatory Class Actions in the New Millennium and the Blurring of CategoricalImperatives, 2003 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 177 (describing
just how blurry the lines between these categories have become).
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there is a good argument that they cannot be included in any class
action under the Constitution, 278 but if they can be included in a
(b) (3) class, it is surely adequacy and not notice or opt-out rights that
perfect a court's jurisdiction over them, because those latter instru2 79
ments are all but "meaningless" to the futures.
Moreover, an opt-out right is completely dependent on notice.
So the question is whether notice in any class action can bear on its
own the weight of perfecting jurisdiction. I submit that it cannot because, as anyone who has ever received notice of a class action (or
watched a television adverstisement purporting to give absentees notice) knows there is simply no equivalence between that notice and
actual service of process in a lawsuit. The first is not an attentionriveting event that concentrates the mind on what is at stake, the latter
is. But even real, i.e., attention-riveting, notice of an actual lawsuit by
itself is not enough to confer jurisdiction on a defendant without minimum contacts with the state court that issues the notice. 28° Why not?
One important reason is that without more evidence of actual "consent" to the jurisdiction of a court that might not be as concerned
with one's interest (because foreign), we consider it necessary for
there to be something more, as a protection against the injustice that
might be visited by that foreign court (on one not its own). I put it to
you that all absentees have at least as much reason to be protected
from any court that proposes to adjudicate their rights outside their
presence, if only because of the likelihood, explained earlier and recognized throughout class action law, that the person not at the negotiating table will be harmed. They, who receive less than attention278 If notice is a constitutional prerequisite in any class action, then as suggested
above, see supra note 230, 1 do not see how they can be provided notice. Second, if, as
the law now seems to be, notice is not always constitutionally required, there is a fairly
strong argument that Article III's case or controversy requirement bars their inclusion. Brief for Amicus Curiae Public Citizen in Support of Respondents at 2, Dow
Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (No. 02-271). Third, there are real
questions about whether they can ever be adequately represented, particularly if adequate representation includes a named representative who can fairly stand in for
them (how does one know, if any one "future" will actually end up being a "future"
affected by the settlement, i.e., will get sick, although one could certainly argue that's
not necessary). But even assuming that is not a serious barrier, there is another, that I
believe is serious. The lawyer fighting for their "interests" will never have a clear idea
of what the future will bring: How many futures will there be-important to how
much money to fight for? What will the law and science look like when they get sick?
Is there sufficient homogeneity among the "futures," given they will get sick in different worlds of law and facts?
279 See infra note 293.
280 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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riveting notice, deserve something more, and at least as much as defendants notified of "foreign court" proceedings, to guarantee that
their interests will be safeguarded. That something more is, and always has been, adequate representation.
Returning to my discussion of the nullity principle, what of the
rule of Walker v. Birmingham28 1 that unconstitutional court orders may
not be challenged by disobedience, unlike unconstitutional statutes?
One must, according to Walker, obey an unconstitutional court order
until it is adjudged unconstitutional. Does that not defeat my argument about the nullity principle being of constitutional dimension, at
least as to absentees? Indeed, Dow argued to the Second Circuit in
Stephenson that Walker supported its position. But the Second Circuit
rightly rejected that argument. 28 2 Walker presumes legitimate jurisdiction. 2 3 There is no Supreme Court authority for the proposition that
an unconstitutional order issued by a court without jurisdiction to issue the order must be obeyed.
The idea that Hansbery states a due process limit on the exercise
of personal jurisdiction along with its necessary corollary, the nullity
principle, is supported not just by the language from Hansbery quoted
above with its cite to Pennoyer,but by Justice Stone's more specific discussion of adequacy of representation. He said:
It is familiar doctrine of the federal courts that members of the class
not present as parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who
are present, or where they actually participate in the conduct of the
284
litigation in which members of the class are present as parties.
All the cases Stone cites for this proposition are collateral attacks
based on lack of jurisdiction, not in class actions but in other types of
proceedings-proceedings unquestionably subject to Pennoyer'snullity
principle.2 8 5 So too are the cases he cites for his next proposition:
281

388 U.S. 307 (1967).

282 Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 257 (2d. Cir. 2001).
283 Walker, 388 U.S. at 315 ("Without question the state court that issues the injunction had, as a court of equity, jurisdiction over the petitioners and over the subject matter of the controversy."). That is not to suggest I am a fan of the rule in
Walker. I am not, see Susan P. Koniak, Wen Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others
Frame It to Their Will, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1075, 1082 n.30 (1993), but my objections to
that case are not relevant here.
284 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940) (citations omitted).
285 See Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500 (1938); Plumb v. Goodnow's
Adm'r, 123 U.S. 560 (1887); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1854);
Bryant Elec. Co. v. Marshall, 169 F. 426 (D. Mass. 1909); Confectioners' Mach. Co. v.
Racine Engine & Mach. Co., 163 F. 914 (E.D. Wisc. 1908).
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"[W]e may [thus] assume that... such procedure [vicarious participation in the suit through adequate representatives] . . .satisf[ies] the
'286
requirements of due process and full faith and credit.

The reading I have given to Hansberny, that it sets forth a constitutional limit on the exercise ofjurisdiction over absentees and that that
limit, like all constitutional limits on jurisdiction, necessarily implies a
nullity principle that guarantees de novo collateral review, is supported by a series of other Supreme Court cases: Phillips Petroleum v.
Shutts, 2 8 7

Martin v. Wilks, 2 8 8 Richards v. Jefferson County, 2 8 9 and most
recently Devlin v.Scardelletti.2 90 Given the limits of space and the fact
that my argument does not depend on those cases, I will not discuss
all of them. But I do want to spend some time on Shutts because some
have suggested that the right of absentees to launch collateral attacks
based on inadequate representation depends on whether Shutts demands such a right.29 ' As my argument thus far shows, I reject that
notion, finding the right implicit in Hansberry and Pennoyer's nullity
principle and seeing Shutts and the other Supreme Court cases just
cited as support for, rather than the source of, the right I claim.
Nonetheless, the centrality of Shutts for scholars like Kahan and Silberman requires me to say something more about it.
In Shutts, the Supreme Court said: "[t] he Due Process Clause of
course requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of absent class members." 292 Now, before we go
any further, I understand perfectly well that the question presented in
Shutts was what are the constitutional limits on the exercise ofjurisdiction by a state court over absent class members from another state. But
all that demonstrates is that Shutts did not expressly rule on whether
adequacy of representation (or notice or the opportunity to be heard,
for that matter- Shutts's other two requirements for legitimate jurisdiction over out-of-state absentees) were also required for the constitutional exercise of jurisdiction over in-staters or those otherwise
within the territorial reach of state or federal courts. Consider this
286 Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 43; see Chandler v. Peketz, 297 U.S. 609 (1936); Main v.
Augedahl, 247 U.S. 142 (1918); Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U.S. 516 (1907). The
sentence I just quoted has become a favorite with those who would deny or limit the
right of absent class members to attack the adequacy of their representation in the
class suit collaterally. It is the words, "such procedure," that these folks embrace. I
will take up that argument later. See infra notes 304-07 and accompanying text.
287 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
288 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
289 517 U.S. 793 (1996).
290 536 U.S. 1 (2002).
291 Kahan & Silberman, supra note 9, at 264 n.193.
292 472 U.S. at 812.
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statement of the issue in Shutt. May a state court exercise legitimate
jurisdiction over out-of-staters who lack minimum contacts with the
state? To that question the court said, yes, provided certain conditions are met. Now it could have meant yes, so long as the state meets
some special hurdle or hurdles that it is not required to meet as to its
own absentees. Or, it could have meant (or later decided it meant),
yes, as long as the state meets the constitutional minimum for the exercise of jurisdiction over absent class members of any variety, it can
then exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state absentees on those same
terms, minimum contacts or not. Those who carry on about how
Shutts only treats adequacy as a constitutional prerequisite forjurisdiction when it comes to out-of-staters are denying the possibility of that
second reading. But the text of Shutts says nothing to foreclose that
reading. Indeed, the Court's discussion of due process in Shutts is
written without constant reference to the special situation of out-ofstaters. Instead, it speaks of the due process rights of absentees largely
without explicitly limiting this part of its holding to out-of-statersperhaps because of sloppy drafting, perhaps not. My point is that it is
no stretch to say Shutts is not clear on the breadth of its ruling on
adequacy. The fact that the question presented was about out-of-staters does not preclude the second reading I described above. Moreover, if you read Hansbeny, as I do, then the second reading of Shutts
3
makes perfect sense. 29
I am apparently not alone in thinking so. Courts consistently cite
Shutts as setting forth what due process requires for the exercise of
jurisdiction over any absentees. 294 The explanation I have just provided supports this common use of Shutts. Does Shutts then add anything to my argument, that is not already present in Hansbeny? Yes,
293 Professor Woolley suggests a third reading: Shutts says that out-of-staters in
state court class actions are entitled to notice and an opportunity to opt out before a
foreign state court takes jurisdiction over them. Woolley, supra note 9, at 392. He
emphasizes that Shutts says notice and a failure to opt out demonstrate "consent" to
jurisdiction, and that's enough. Id. at 396. I think that is a strained reading of Shutts.
Of course, as should be obvious by now, I believe there is always more than one way to
read a case, and the reading most in accord with other law and sense should be
picked whenever possible. Given my argument about Hansberry and Pennoyer, not to
mention the sophistry that it would entail for the law to place so much weight on the
fiction that class notices actually notify anyone of much, I do not think Woolley's
reading meets that test. Moreover, nothing in Shutts dictates that we understand
"consent" to be sufficient when one doesn't show up, particularly given that absentees
must act to get out of an action, i.e., they are in by default. Requiring one to take
action to avoid the jurisdiction of a court that otherwise lacks jurisdiction is not consistent with Pennoyers nullity principle.
294 See, e.g., Ivy/Hartman, 996 F.2d 1425, 1435 (2d Cir. 1993).
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Shutts calls our attention to the scope of the adequacy requirement: it
must be present at all times-throughout the proceeding. 295 The notion of "adequacy at all times" is consistent with collateral review and
entirely inconsistent with the proposition that absentees must challenge adequacy in the original proceedings or find themselves bound.
This argument was well expressed by the Ninth Circuit in the nowwithdrawn Epstein II. Relying primarily on Gonzales v. Cassidy,29 6 which
the court called a precursor to Shutts, 2 9 7 the Ninth Circuit used the
"adequacy at all times" requirement to counter what it called Matsushita's intervene-or-be-estopped argument: adequacy at all times necessarily implies a "hindsight approach. 298
Indeed, as the BancBoston settlement demonstrates the inadequacy of counsel may not be apparent until after the fairness hearing
is over.2 9 9 Or, as Stephenson demonstrates, the inadequacy of counsel

may not be understood by the absent class member as affecting him
until the time for appeal is long past. Is the adequacy that Hansbeny
requires lost in situations like those? If not, collateral attack must be
permitted.
295 Nagareda singles out these words "at all times" as the cause of mischief because
people like Woolley and Monaghan (and now me) have made more of these words
than they should in their effort to support a broad right of collateral attack based on
inadequate representation. Nagareda, supra note 9, at 315. His critique, however, is
only important if the line he tries to draw between pre- and post-judgment conflicts is
sensible. I have already explained, see supra text accompanying note 279, that I do not
think it issensible, coherent or consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Having
said that, my argument is in no way dependent on Shutts's "at all times" language.
Indeed, my argument is not dependent on Shutts at all, except insofar as I need to
demonstrate that Shutts is not inconsistent with my reading of Hansbery and the nullity principle.
296 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
297 Gonzales involved a collateral attack to a federal class action. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit calling it a precursor to Shutts and using it to give meaning to the adequacy
required under Shutts (recall that Matsushita did involve the exercise of jurisdiction
over absent out-of-staters, and thus was a Shutts case under either reading one or two
of Shutts) is just an example of the implicit assumption made by most courts that
Shutts's adequacy requirement is implicit in due process apart from the foreign court
issue.
298 Epstein II, 126 F.3d 1235, 1243 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Gonzales, 474 F.2d at 73
n.ll).
299 The formula that allowed a certain percentage of each class member's escrow
account to be taken to pay attorneys' fees, whether or not the class member had been
forced to keep excess money in her account, could not have been imagined by any
class member until the fairness hearing was over in that it was not explained in any
paper the class received prior to the fairness hearing. See Koniak & Cohen, supranote
9, at 1057-68.
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The Other Side's Best Arguments

The discussion of Shutts above is my answer to one of the main
arguments made by those who would restrict the intervene-or-be-estopped argument, i.e., that Shutts does not hold there is a right to
collateral attack. 30 0 In sum, I reply, yes, but nothing about it is inconsistent with such a right, and some of it is quite supportive of such a
right. All in all, I do not, however, see Shutts as one of the stronger
arguments against my position. There are, however, other arguments.
And I want to address next those that some find quite persuasive.
First, is the argument that all due process requires of a state (or
any) class action court is fair procedures for determining adequacy,
not adequacy itself.30 1 Hansbery, it is said, supports (or at least is consistent with) this view. The Ninth Circuit used Hansberry to support
this idea in Epstein Ill'
As the court stated in Hansberry... "there has been a failure of due
process only in those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of the
absent parties who are to be bound by it."
The Ninth Circuit continued:
Due process requires that an absent class member's right to adequate representation be protected by the adoption of the appropriate procedures by the certifying court and by the courts that review
its determinations [on direct appeal]; due process does not require
30 2
collateral second-guessing of those determinations and review.
I have already explained, first in discussing the nullity principle
and then in discussing the requirement that representation be adequate at all times, why I believe that due process requires just such
second-guessing. I will not repeat that here. But what about that.
Hansbeny quote? It does seem to support the procedures-are-enough
approach adopted in Epstein Il.
300 The argument is set forth most thoroughly in a widely-cited article by Professors Kahan & Silbennan, supra note 9, at 266-71. As suggested in the text, I do not
find the Shutts argument persuasive at all. For those who do and find my reply to it
too simple, Professor Woolley, supra note 9, at 439-45, provides a much more detailed rebuttal to Kahan and Silberman on Shutts as well as to the rest of their quite
thorough piece. I encourage all those interested in this topic to read the work of
those three scholars.
301 Kahan & Silberman, supranote 9, at 264. It was also made by the briefs submitted to the Supreme Court by and in support of Dow. See, e.g., Brief of the Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson,
539 U.S. 111 (2003) (No. 02-271).
302 Epstein III, 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Not really. First, notice that the beginning of the quote is lopped
off in Epstein III. There is something missing before the word "there."
The beginning of the sentence is: "With a proper regard for divergent
local institutions and interests, this Court is justified in saying that
...
."
Restoring the beginning of the quote helps to show that the
sentence is an introductory caveat, a reminder by the Court to itself
and others, that it will not disrupt state institutions any more than is
necessary. It is not, as the Ninth Circuit and others insist, an endorsement of an open-ended approach to the methods that states might use
to bind absentees. At least, I submit it is hardly a required reading of
that language and not the best reading either. Consider the pinpoint
cite that Justice Stone provides at the end of that sentence, not with a
"cr ' or a "but see," but as direct support for the point of the sentence:

"Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897)." That
page gives no support for the "any procedures will do" reading in Epstein III. It says:
In determining what is due process of law regard must be had to
substance, not to form. This court, referring to the Fourteenth
Amendment, has said: "Can a State make anything due process of
law which, by its own legislation, it chooses to declare such? To
affirm this is to hold that the prohibition to the States [the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause] is of no avail, or has no
application where the invasion of private rights is effected under the
forms of state legislation." Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102.
The same question could be propounded, and the same answer
should be made, in reference to judicial proceedings inconsistent
with the requirement of due process of law. If compensation for
private property taken for public use is an essential element of due
process of law as ordained by the Fourteenth Amendment, then the
final judgment of a state court, under the authority of which the
property is in fact taken, is to be deemed the act of the State within
30 3
the meaning of that amendment.
More important, the "procedure adopted" quote from Hansberry
used in Epstein III precedes the Court's statement that adequacy "in
fact" has long been accepted as allowing federal courts to bind absent
class members, and the conclusion the Court draws from that, i.e.,
that the Court may thus safely assume that "such procedure" would
satisfy due process and full faith and credit when provided absentees
by a state.3 0 4 The other side would read the words "such procedure ' 30 5 to support their procedure-for-finding-adequacy, not ade303
304
305

Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897)
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940).
Id.
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quacy itself, position. But the simplest reading of that sentence is that
"such procedure" refers to the presence of adequate representation in
fact. Hansbery, after all, does not say that given that the state procedure for finding adequacy was nonexistent in the original proceeding,
Hansberry is not bound. Moreover, if it meant that (but didn't quite
say it) then there would have been no need for the Court to explain
why the representation provided Hansberry was inadequate, which it
did. To be clear: the Court examined the representation in Hansbery
itself and found that it was inadequate. 30 6 The inadequacy of that representation would have been beside the point, if the key was the lack
30 7
of adequate state procedures to find adequacy.
The Ninth Circuit, as mentioned earlier, also relied on Kremer v.
Chemical Construction Corp.308 to support its view. Kremer had held that
a state's administrative proceeding was entitled to full faith and credit
because it had provided the "minimum procedural requirements of
[due process]."309 Judgments about which "there is reason to doubt

the quality, extensiveness or fairness of the procedures" 310 are entitled
to review, according to Kremer. Thus, Epstein III says: "Limited collateral review [of one state's class action judgment] would be appropriate, therefore, to consider whether the procedures . . .afforded the

party [now collaterally attacking the judgment] a 'full and fair opportunity' to litigate the claim or issue." 31 1 That would not, however, allow for reconsideration of whether the absent class member had
actually been adequately represented.
In Epstein II, the Ninth Circuit had, as mentioned earlier, rejected
this "simplistic application of Kremer." Kremer had nothing to do with
absentees; it contemplated a traditional model of process where the
party is actually present before the court to contest the merits of the
issue under the process provided, as Epstein II pointed out. 312 To say
that due process is satisfied by any process that allows someone actually present before a court a full and fair chance to litigate an issue is
quite different from saying that due process is satisfied by any process
306 Id. at 45.
307 Moreover, Justice Stone's "we may assume for present purposes [that adequacy
suffices to satisfy due process]" sentence, id. at 43, can as easily be read to say that
maybe more than adequacy of representation is required for due process, as to suggest that adequacy or maybe some substitute for adequacy (like a procedure for finding adequacy) would suffice.
308 456 U.S. 461 (1981).
309 Id. at 481.
310 Id. (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n.11 (1979)).
311 Epstein IIl, 179 F.3d 641, 648-49 (9th Cir. 1999).
312 Epstein II,126 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 1997).
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that invites absentees to participate in the action, if they so choose.
And it is miles apart from a process that tells absentees that they need
not bother attending because class counsel is bound to represent
3 13
them, which is what absentees are told.

Absentees are intended to be absent, as I said at the start of this
Article. Otherwise the class device is unnecessary. Absence is, indeed,
central to orderly class action procedure. If all absentees actually
showed up in massive class actions and demanded to be heard, the
class action could not proceed. Given that absence is assumed, the
"procedure-that-affords-an-opportunity-to-litigate" model simply has
no place in the discussion. It cannot be taken seriously. If all absentees were actually guaranteed such procedures, adequately informed
about them and about the effects of foregoing them, many class actions would come to a grinding halt-a far more realistic threat than
those harped on by the opponents of collateral attack. 3 14 Neither the
class action device itself nor any court's class action procedure is designed to afford every absent class member a full and fair opportunity
to contest whatever matter they choose.
Consider, for example, the limitations routinely and understandably placed on objectors, no less those on the absent class: no right to
315
discovery; no right to produce witnesses; no right to cross-examine.
All of those matters are left to the sound discretion of the trial
court.3

16

If the Kremer model was taken seriously, every collateral at-

tack would succeed because absent class members are not each, and
cannot each, be given the full and fair opportunity to participate in
the proceedings. 3 17 The class action device would come undone.
313

MANuAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 41.41, at

472 (1995).

314 See infra text accompanying notes 352-53 (discussing the threats to class actions that opponents of collateral attack insist will accompany an affirmation of a right
that many assume has been around since Hansbery was decided in 1940).
315 Koniak, supra note 35, at 294-98.
316 Id.
317 Kahan and Silberman make a valiant effort to suggest revisions to class action
practice to make the "full and fair opportunity" mantra less embarrassing to speak
aloud. See Kahan & Silberman, supra note 9, at 251-52. I support many of their suggestions, but not as a substitute for collateral attack. To name one of the biggest
problems with any proposal to substitute for collateral review fairer procedures in the
original action: inadequacy that is not visible in time for it to be raised at the fairness
hearing cannot by definition be raised in those proceedings. Here, Kahan and Silberman reach for the malpractice solution, noting that they agree with Professor Cohen
and I that class counsel should be subject to such suit. Id. at 253 n.122. Yes, but as
Professor Cohen and I explain in painstaking detail, courts have proven completely
resistant to such suits, holding in most cases that court approval of the class settlement magically precludes any malpractice action against class counsel. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 9, at 1171. We argue that that approach is nonsensical as a matter of
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The procedures-only argument is at its core a form of waiver argument. You chose not to object; you have waived your chance to
contest adequacy. And for that reason it is disingenuous at its core:
absent class members are not supposed to all show up and contest
matters. Notices, in fact, make clear that staying away is a perfectly
appropriate response. 3 18 Having invited passivity, indeed depending
upon just such passivity, what kind of legal system would then penalize
it? Not one committed to "due process."
An argument that is often made in conjunction with the procedures-only argument is one that would substitute objectors for collateral attack. 319 The idea would be to bar collateral attack at least in
those cases when objectors actually appeared and challenged adequacy. This is really a milder version of the procedures-only argument, which in pure form holds that a process that allows for
objectors, whether they show up or not, bars collateral attack. The
"objectors" variant is, however, if anything even more incoherent. As
the Epstein II court said: "Objectors are objectors, not named representatives. '3 20 No precedent supports the proposition that absentees
may be bound by those no one even pretended to find adequate to
stand in their shoes, i.e., objectors, who are not subjected to any "ade3 21
quacy" test.

Perhaps the strongest argument for the position I oppose is the
defendants' interest in finality, if only because finality has become a
near-sure-fire argument in the last few decades of constitutional
law.3 22 This argument was pressed vigorously by the petitioners before
the Supreme Court in Stephenson, and is relied on by Kahan and Silberman as well. The long years between the settlement in Agent Orange and Stephenson's challenge as well as the many previous court
rulings on the adequacy of the representation in the original class action make this argument concrete and compelling.
It is no secret and no sin that the aim of defendants in mass tort
class actions, particularly those involving products that produce injupreclusion law and unsound as a matter of policy. But the courts have yet to change
their view of such suits.
318 See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
319 Although as noted earlier, Kahan and Silberman, to their credit, reject this
argument, see Kahan & Silberman, supra note 9, at 244, and Judge O'Scannlain aban-

doned it sometime between his dissent in Epstein II and his majority opinion in Epstein
III. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
320 Epstein II, 126 F.3d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir. 1997).
321 Kahan and Silberman critique this approach on the same ground. See Kahan
& Silberman, supra note 9, at 264-74.
322 Most notably this is true in the law of habeas corpus. See Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 306 (1988).
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ries that take years to manifest, like asbestos, tobacco, and Agent Orange, is "global peace," an end to litigation on the matter. That is why
these class actions are continually stretching the boundaries on who
may be included in the class, i.e., people not yet ill, not yet born, not
yet conceived, etc.
Defendants argue that they have no incentive to settle class actions without some guarantee of finality. I will take up that argument
before we are through, but first I want to address the doctrinal arguments used to bolster this search for finality. In its Stephenson brief to
the Supreme Court, Dow argued that the Court should assess what
process is due the absent class using the balancing test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge.323 According to Dow, that test would require the
Court (or each court faced with a collateral attack-the brief is unclear on that matter) to balance the interests that would be protected
by more process (and the degree to which they would be protected),
against the private interests that might be harmed or burdened by
that additional process, and, finally, against the interest of the courts
324 Of
in the efficient and nonduplicative administration of justice.
course, the last two factors, at least according to Dow, come out clearly
in favor of no collateral review of adequacy, which always disturbs the
defendant's interest in finality, costs it money, and eats up court time
and resources. What about factor one? The interest of absent class
members differs widely from one class action to another. What could
be at stake is compensation for a life threatening injury or back interest on small sums held in escrow accounts. In short, the Mathews test
cannot be applied to the question at hand at the level of generality
needed to justify the defendants' preferred outcome-no collateral
attack of adequacy-or even its next best outcome-no de novo review of adequacy.
That explains why the Mathews argument in Dow's brief was, all
apologies to the drafters, nearly incoherent. Dow argued that its finality interests, among other of its interests, should weigh heavily in the
Mathews calculus, whereas what Stephenson stood to gain was minimal.3 25 Separate representation in Agent Orangewould have done his
subgroup little good, as no veteran got much under the settlement,
and, according to Stephenson and Ivy/Hartman, not much was justified.
Stephenson had an all-but-meritless claim in 1984, assuming he had
any claim at all in 1984, and he's got a worthless claim now.
323 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
324 See Brief for Petitioners at 34-40, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111
(2003) (No. 02-271).
325 Id. at 37-38.
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Here is the problem: if Mathews demands the kind of case-by-case
determination of what an absent class member has at stake in his bid
for "more process"-which here means the right to collateral attack
based on inadequacy of representation-that the Dow brief suggests,
then all of the supposed savings of costs for the defendant and the
courts to be considered under Mathews's other two prongs disappear.
The kind of inquiry Dow seems to suggest should proceed a determination on whether collateral attack is available would be just as costly
as providing collateral review in the first place. Moreover, I do not see
any sensible way, giving the wide range of interests that might be at
stake in class actions, to apply Mathews to class actions without this
3 26
costly case by case approach.
But there is a second doctrinal argument about finality. The interests in finality are, the Court has said, greater in civil cases than in
criminal ones. Thus, the right of absent class members to attack adequacy should be no greater (and probably less) than the due process
right of those convicted of crimes who seek habeas corpus (collateral)
review of the constitutionality of their convictions. Dow made that
argument too, 3 2 7 and it has a certain surface plausibility. If correct,
this argument would have the following implications and maybe
more. One, as in habeas cases, the absent class member should be
precluded from collateral attack if he has not first exhausted his other
remedies, i.e., if he has failed to intervene and object. Two, if collateral attack of any sort is allowed, the absent class member should not
be entitled to any "new law" on adequacy, i.e., the court should assess
whether the representation was adequate under the law of adequacy
326 Given that the test in Mathews demands attention to the interests of the parties
that are actually at stake, it is thus no wonder that Dow ends up arguing about Stephenson's interests. Mathews thus cannot do much to promote the finality interest of
defendants without, that is, doing violence to the test articulated in that case. Another problem with the Mathews argument deserves mention. In Dusenbery v. United
States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002), the Court specifically stated that Mathews is not designed to replace all other procedural law to become some general balancing test for
what procedure is due in every situation. Where there is extant procedural law, it is
that law that governs, not Mathews. Id. But cf Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633,
2646-49 (2004) (using Mathews to analyze process due a foreign citizen labeled an
enemy combatant by the executive branch). It is, of course, my position that Hansberry and Pennoyers nullity principle are extant law. In any event, given that little in
added finality or efficiency would be gained by applying Mathews to each instance in
which an absentee sought to collaterally attack a settlement or judgment based on
inadequate representation, if the Court thinks there is not extant law governing the
right of absentees to bring such a challenge, it should state a rule, not leave the matter to Mathews-type balancing.
327 See Brief for Petitioners at 42-44, Stephenson (No. 02-271).
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as it existed at the time of the first court's judgment. This second
proposition relies on Teague v. Lane3 28 and its progeny.3 29 Teague held
that a person convicted of a crime could not claim in a habeas petition that her conviction was unconstitutional based on Supreme
Court precedent announcing "new law" after direct review of the conviction was completed unless the alleged constitutional violation denied a right so fundamental to basic fairness as to warrant its
retroactive application to all convictions. 330 Transferring that doctrine here would mean that Stephenson would not get the benefit of
Amchem or Ortiz, assuming that either decision announced new law,
unless either decision articulated a new rule that was at the core of fair
process.

33 1

The problem with the entire line of argument is this: absent class
members and convicted criminal defendants are not in remotely analogous procedural positions. The limits on habeas review all presume
that the defendant was present throughout the proceedings and represented by reasonably competent counsel (unless that right was
knowingly and specifically waived). It is in other words premised on
the notion that the person seeking collateral review was actually present and represented and thus had every chance to raise whatever
constitutional infirmities he is now seeking to raise in a collateral attack. Again, by definition, the absent class member is not present and
the question of the collateral attack is whether that person was adequately represented, so that cannot be presumed either. Indeed, the
two civil cases relied on by the petitioners in Stephenson for the proposition that collateral attacks may be barred even when they speak to
328 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
329 See, e.g., Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266 (2002); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000); O'Dell v. Netherlands, 521 U.S. 151 (1997); Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115
(1995); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 (1994); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333
(1993); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222
(1992); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
330 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1988).
331 This argument is pressed in Stephenson to deny Stephenson the benefit of
Amchem and Ortiz, which are fatal to the claim that Stephenson was adequately represented in the original class action. Brief for Petitioners at 46-50, Stephenson (No. 02271). However, neither Amchem nor Ortiz announced new law. Even accepting that
Amchem or Ortiz are new law, Stephenson should still win without the holdings of
Amchem or Ortiz. See Koniak, Feasting, supra note 9, at 1086-95 (arguing prior to the
Supreme Court decisions of Amchem and Ortiz that those not knowing they have been
injured cannot be members of a class action because of basic unfairness, lack of an
Article III case or controversy, and lack of notice of an ability to opt out). Prior to
Agent Orange, no case had suggested that those parties not having injuries could be
adequately represented in a class along with those presently injured. Id. at 1087.
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jurisdiction, Durfee v. Duke3 2 and Chicot County DrainageDistrict v. Baxter State Bank,333 both involved civil parties who were actually present
before the court (as criminal defendants would be) and who had had
every opportunity to raise all jurisdictional issues with the court. And
33 4
both cases emphasize those facts.
Finally, let me nowjust say a few words about the Supreme Court
cases I mentioned with Shutts and did not discuss. Richards v. Jefferson
County335 and Martin v. Wilks 33 6 are two relatively recent cases that
demonstrate the continued vitality of Hansberry.33 7 Moreover, both involve collateral attacks as did Hansberry, and neither supports the intervene-or-be-estopped
approach.
But Wilks was substantially
3 38
modified by statute..
If I am right about Hansberry, the constitutionality of that statute is doubtful, but I am not the first to make that
point.
There is, however, a difference between my approach and the
language of Wilks. Wilks describes the rule on adequacy as grounded
in our commitment to each person's entitlement to "a day in
court."339 Please notice that nothing in my argument is dependent on
giving each person a day in court. 340 And I fail to understand how
"adequate representation" somehow vindicates that notion. Virtual
representation in a class action, along with others similarly situated, is
341
simply not equivalent to one's day in court. That's fine with me.
332 375 U.S. 105 (1963).
333 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
334 See Durfee, 375 U.S. at 115; Chicot, 308 U.S. at 378.
335 517 U.S. 793 (1996).
336 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
337 See Richards, 517 U.S. at 794; Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762.
338 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000)); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.
244, 251 (1994) ("[Section] 108 responds to Martin v. Wilks... by prohibiting certain
challenges to employment practices implementing consent decrees .

. . .").

The con-

stitutionality of this law remains unclear.
339 Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762.
340 See David Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 913, 923 (1998) (arguing that the "day in court" model distorts the analysis of
class action problems).
341 The strong position I have taken elsewhere against collusion and for fairer
class action procedures has sometimes been mistaken as representing some commitment by me to the "day in court" model of litigation. I have no such commitment and
never had one. Indeed, I see it as demeaning the class action device, a device I believe in. I agree with Professor Shapiro that the "day in court" model only distorts
analysis in this area.
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Class actions are old instruments of equity. 342 Group adjudication is

neither novel nor, in my opinion, in any way at odds with fundamental
notions of procedural fairness. My entire argument is based on the
notion that adequacy of representation, as the Court said in Hansbery,
is what brings group adjudication within traditional concepts of procedural fairness. To the extent Wilks suggests another reason to treat
adequacy as central, I disagree.
Lastly, Devlin v. Scardelletti3 43 must be considered. In De'vlin, the
Court held that class members who are not named in the complaint
may appeal only if they objected to the proposed judgment, and even
then only to the extent their appeal relates to their objections. 3 44 All
other class members not named in the complaint are regarded as non3
parties for purposes of appeal and cannot appeal as of right.

45

Now, consider Devlin in light of the "at all times" requirement. In
BancBoston, the notice of the fairness hearing did not reveal the attorneys' fee plan.3 4 6 Indeed, according to the record 34 7 the plan or
scheme had not been finalized at the time the notice went out. The
fairness hearing was held. Imagine now that a smart newspaper reporter had been present. He puts together what he heard, asks a few
questions, gets a few folks to talk and pieces together the plan. He
writes a story. Absent class members are now alerted to the inadequate representation, but because they did not know earlier, they
would have failed to object. Thus they could not appeal the determination of adequacy, according to the simplest reading of Devlin.3 48
Would they be estopped forever from raising adequacy because collateral attack too is barred? Is that consistent with a "requirement" of
342 SeeYeazell, supra note 7, at 692-96 (tracing the history of the class action from
the chancery courts to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
343

536 U.S. 1 (2002).

344

Id. at 11.

345

See id. Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, adopts

an even narrower view of what constitutes a party for purpose of appeal in a class
action: "[O]nly members of a class who are . . . named in the complaint are the class
representatives; ... it is only these members of the class, and those who intervene or
otherwise enter through third-party practice, who are parties to the class judgment."
Id. at 15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

346 See State v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997, 1009-10 (Vt. 2003).
347 Id. at 1000.
348 Admittedly Devlin might be read to say that, if one objects, one can appeal, and
we do not decide whether those who fail to object may ever appeal. Moreover, I
would hope that someday it is read that way, but, for now, it seems that Devlin is taken
to stand for the proposition that objectors may appeal and not every absent class
member. See, e.g., Ballard v. Garrett, 78 S.W. 3d 73, 74 n.2 (Ark. 2002).
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adequacy of representation at all times? With anyone's notion of fair
process?
Although Devlin eschews formalistic reasoning about who counts
as a party and who does not, its holding does treat absentees who fail
to object as something significantly less than "parties. '3

49

To hold af-

ter Devlin that absentees who fail to object are nonetheless "parties"
enough to be precluded from collateral attack would be grossly unfair.
Moreover, it might wreak havoc in the real world. And that is where I
want to leave you, back in the real world. So let me conclude by examining the real world implications of the legal position I have
presented.
C.

Will the Sky Fall?

Proponents of barring or seriously restricting collateral attack by
absent class members claim the sky will fall if collateral attack with de
novo review is permitted.3 5 0 Class actions will not settle or will settle
much more rarely than they now do. The courts will be clogged with
absent class members re-litigating every issue in every settlement. Life
as we know it will all but come to an end.
But all of that is demonstrably false because, with the exception
of Epstein III, no federal circuit and no state court has moved to limit
the traditional rule allowing collateral attack that many, if not most,
people assumed was the law, at least since Hansberny. Almost every
class action settles. And there is no evidence whatsoever that absent
class members are clogging the courts with collateral attacks anywhere.3 5 ' And they never have. The argument that the sky will fall
unless collateral attacks are barred is specious.
349 Here once again, Nagareda and I see matters quite differently. Professor
Nagareda reads Devlin as inconsistent (or potentially inconsistent) with Hansbeny because Devlin acknowledges that for purposes of appeal absentees are the equivalent of
parties. Nagareda, supra note 9, at 331 ("[T]he Court cast uncertainty over Hansberry's understanding of absent class members as nonparties."). He then laments that
the 4-4 split in Stephenson prevented the Court from writing an opinion that would
have cleared up the seeming inconsistency between Hansberryand Devlin. Id. at 332.
Given that Devlin did not hold that absentees were parties for all purposes and, indeed, that it went out of its way to discourage a formalistic approach to the question
of whether absentees are parties, I do not think Nagareda has a point here.
350 See Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 19-20, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (No. 02-271);
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 20, Stephenson (No. 02-271).
351 See Woolley, supra note 9, at 443 n.268 (noting the rarity of collateral attacks
and describing his own informal survey on Westlaw of the cases). Between the years
1966 and 2000, Woolley could find only forty-four cases (state and federal) that were
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What then accounts for the alarm raised by the many corporations and business associations appearing before the Supreme Court
in Stephenson as amici? Perhaps they fear that the Second Circuit's
opinion, or an opinion by the Supreme Court affirming settled law,
would change the status quo by making plain a right that absent class
members might now not be aware they possess. Petitioners in Stephenson admit, and indeed try to use to their advantage, the fact that the
settlement there contained explicit language purporting to negate the
availability of collateral attack. Until and unless the Supreme Court
rules otherwise, such statements are misleading, at best, but perhaps
defendants believe that they account for the rarity of collateral attacks.
But I do not believe the defendants think that. Many collateral
challenges to class action judgments or settlements-and certainly all
challenges involving small individual claims-would take the form of
a second class action that would be driven, for all practical purposes,
by plaintiffs' lawyers who are familiar with the state of class action law
and would be extremely unlikely to be deceived by such language.
Why then do we not see many collateral attacks? The chance of
persuading the second court (not an appeals court, but another triallevel court) to say that the first court erred is exceedingly slim, even
when the second court is proceeding de novo. Trial judges are naturally, and in most cases appropriately, reluctant to hold that another
trial judge made such an error. More to the point, lawyers know that.
Thus, there is little incentive for a plaintiffs lawyer (working almost
always for a contingent fee) to bring a collateral attack. Moreover, to
the extent that some plaintiffs' lawyers are interested only in seeking a
quick payoff from class counsel and defense counsel as a quid pro quo
for dropping nuisance or "strike suit"-type claims, those lawyers have
simpler and more lucrative means of extracting such payoffs, i.e.,
presenting or threatening to present objections in the class action
352
proceeding itself.

collateral attacks on class action judgments or settlements based on inadequate representation. Id.

352 As the Advisory Committee's Comments to its latest proposals for amending
Rule 23 stress, some objectors' primary purpose is to induce class counsel and defendants to reach a separate accord with them to make them go away. Even though objections to a class settlement are unlikely to scuttle the settlement altogether, the risk is
too great for class counsel and the defendants to take: if the settlement is rejected by
the court, every class member will be free immediately to sue individually (in a large
stakes case), and every plaintiff's lawyer will be free immediately to file new class actions (in cases where the stakes are too small for individual suits). See FED. R. Civ. P.
23 (g) advisory committee's notes.
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But that just leaves us with my earlier question: Why are so many
defendants and potential defendants pushing so hard for a rule that
would "cure" a problem that does not exist-namely, a plethora of
bogus collateral attack suits? There are two plausible answers. First,
litigants pursue finality as an end in itself. Indeed, the reason defendants have embraced class action settlements as a means of resolving
"mass tort" cases is that they provide a path around one-way preclusion, a legal precept that prevents defendants from using a victory in
3 53
one individual law suit to bar suits by all those similarly injured.
Class actions function as an important escape route, albeit a non-absolute one, from the effects of nonmutual preclusion. Petitioners and
their amici want that escape route to be absolute. The Supreme Court
does not seem inclined to change the rule on nonmutual preclusion.
But if the Court adopted any significant bar on collateral attack by
absent class members, the law in sum would be this: although (in the
absence of a relationship of privity) one individual pursuing a case
with vigor can never bind another, - 5 4 no matter how similar their two
cases, a class action plaintiff and her lawyer-even with every incentive
to settle on the cheap-can bind an entire group of people, even if, in
fact, as Hansbeny puts it, adequate representation was lacking. The
Court's 4-4 split suggests that it might endorse just such a ludicrous
result. One can only hope that it realizes that before rendering procedural law so nonsensical.
The second plausible reason for the defendants' quest for an absolute bar on collateral attack is less attractive, but all too real: a bar
would facilitate egregious collusion between class counsel and defendants. Consider what happens in those rare cases when a trial or appellate court rejects a settlement on the basis of collusion or any other
ground. The parties can go to another trial court, change a term or
two-although that is not technically necessary-and ask the second
court to accept the deal. 35 5 One important, though hardly perfect,
deterrent to such behavior is the prospect of de novo review by a sec353 See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 716-18 (5th ed. 2001).
354 South Central Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 167-68 (1999); see Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996).
355 In Zografros v. Qwest Communications, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Ore. 2002), for
example, the court concluded that class counsel and defendants "at some point, became unhappy that the court would not rush approval of their proposed settlement,
but instead intended to carefully consider and thoroughly scrutinize it" and hence
"abruptly remov[ed] themselves from the Chicago District Court's jurisdiction to start
anew in Portland." Id. at 1223-24. Similarly, in In re GeneralMotors Corp. Pick-Up Truck
Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, 134 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 1998), after the Third
Circuit set aside a class action settlement, "the parties to the settlement repaired to
the 18thJudicial District for the Parish of Iberville, Louisiana, where a similar suit had
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ond court in a collateral attack. De novo review avoids the unacceptable result that the last court's "adequacy of representation" finding
will supersede the findings of inadequacy by the earlier courts. Thus,
the availability of de novo review of adequacy of representation makes
it less worthwhile for litigants to shop collusive settlements.
Moreover, settlement shopping is not the only way to obtain
court approval for a collusive deal.3 56 If, for example, counsel for an
objecting member of the class succeeds in persuading the court to
reject a settlement on grounds of inadequate representation (or indeed, on any grounds), there will be no fund from which that counsel
can recover fees. Thus, most objectors are careful to avoid pushing
too hard any argument that might completely scuttle the settlement.
This is yet another reason it makes no sense to hold that the presence
of objectors somehow suffices to eliminate the rights of all absentees
to attack the settlement collaterally. More to the point, objectors are
rare. 35 7 In sum then, the first court's decision on adequacy is highly
unlikely to be based on clashing presentations by true adversaries. Indeed, even those objectors dedicated to the presentation of serious
objections-even those willing, if necessary, to scuttle the entire
deal-are severely limited in their effectiveness because most courts
either deny them discovery altogether or sharply restrict it.3 58
What about the Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.3 59 compromise
position, i.e., that the absentees' right to attack adequacy collaterally
should depend on whether the defendant had "notice" during the
3 60
original proceeding that the representation was less than adequate?
been pending, restructured their deal, and submitted it to the Louisiana court, which
ultimately approved it." Id. at 137.
This problem recently prompted the Seventh Circuit to issue a ruling as disruptive to the coherence of procedural law. In In re Bridgestone/Firestone,333 F.3d 763
(7th Cir. 2003), the court held that its previous decision that a class could not be
certified bound the "class" (here in quotes because the prior decision said there was
and could be no class) because the "class" (or non-class) had been adequately represented. How members of an entity that the law does not recognize (a class that may
not be certified) can be bound by any judgment escapes me, but that problem is
beyond the scope of this Article. Here, what is important is that in every other circuit,
the problem of shopping settlements continues.
356 For a fuller discussion of practices discussed in this paragraph, see Koniak &
Cohen, supra note 9, at 1104-12 (1996); and Katherine Ikeda, Note, Silencing The
Objectors, 15 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 177, 180 (2001).
357 See Thomas E. Willging et al., supra note 50, at 140 (concluding that there were
no objectors in forty-two to sixty-four percent of the fairness hearings in four federal
judicial districts).
358 See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
359 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992).
360 Id. at 390-91; State v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997, 1017 (Vt. 2003).

2004]

0]OW

LIKE A

WINTER?

As Professor Woolley notes, Ticora's compromise is not generally used
by courts; 3 6 1 it is just talked about.3 62 Good thing too, given that it
makes little sense. If adequacy is jurisdictional, as I maintain, what
relevance is the defendant's state of mind or anyone else's state of
mind for that matter? The opposing parties' perception of jurisdictional problems has never been thought relevant to whether jurisdiction exists. Moreover, Ticor is incoherent whether or not adequacy is
necessary for the constitutional exercise ofjurisdiction over absentees.
Adequacy is a protection for the absent class. It makes no sense to say
that that protection is unnecessary when the harm from its absence
was not apparent to the defendant (or the court). There is no reason
to think that inadequate representation that is hidden (often perhaps
by the actions of the inadequate representatives who have an interest
in hiding it) is any less detrimental to the absent class than inadequacy
that is blatant. Indeed, there is reason to think it is more harmful in
that presumably if the defendant could not see it, neither could any
absentees or the court, which means no steps to mitigate it could have
been taken. Ticor is based, obviously, on some misguided attempt to
split the baby, i.e., take into account not just the absent class members' interests but also the defendants' interest in finality. It fails.
But can class action practice really continue with no guarantee
that settlements are final? That question pressed with such earnestness by opponents of collateral attack is, in truth, absurd.
As Professor Geoffrey Hazard, writing with Professors John L.
Gedid and Stephen Sowle, put it:
It is probably impossible to guarantee prospectively the conclusive
effect of a class suit judgment. However, that is not really a serious
objection to the class suit procedure, or to there being valid class
suitjudgments. It is impossible to "guarantee" the conclusive effect
of anyjudgment. A litigant always remains free to say that there was
no actual service of process, or that the process was invalid in some
respect, or that the proceeding was invalidated by fraud, and so
on.

36 3

I rest my case.
364

CONCLUSION: SUMMER AND His PLEASURES, WAT ON THEE

In the real world de novo review has done nothing to interfere
with settlements in class action cases. And, I have tried to show, it
361

Woolley, supra note 9, at 422 n.170.

362
363

Homeside Lending, 826 A.2d at 1017.
Hazard et al., supra note 9, at 1946.
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at 11.
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makes sense as a check on collusion. The second court cannot be
confident that the first court had the necessary information before it
in rendering its findings on adequacy. It is the second court, not the
first, that is more likely to hear that clash of positions deemed central
in our system to reliable court rulings. A fairness hearing on a proposed class settlement may consist of nothing more than a rehearsed
joint presentation by class counsel and defense counsel. In Judge Easterbrook's words, "[r]epresentative plaintiffs and their lawyers may be
imperfect agents of other class members-may even put one over on
the court, in a staged performance.... [T]he court can't vindicate the
class's rights because the friendly presentation means that it lacks essential information. ''
Given the realities of class action practice, de novo review by the
second court is essential if absent class members are to receive adequate representation in fact. To change existing law and adopt a standard of high deference to the first court, or to restrict review to the
procedures used by the first court, or to bar collateral attack altogether would rest law upon fiction: that the first court is likely to have
had all the information it needed or that any procedure can ensure
that the first court gets that information, or that absentees can actually
have a full and fair opportunity to challenge adequacy at the fairness
hearing.
Law that is to command respect should not be so at odds with
reality. Maybe the Supreme Court will see that the next time it decides to review this question.

365 Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1352 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

